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ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the European Court of Human Rights’s
use of the margin of appreciation in cases involving religious symbols can be seen as the Court’s status-seeking mechanism, whose
application varies with the status of states, and the social status
and distance of religious symbols from mainstream social norms.
Notwithstanding the Court’s self-restraint through the margin of
appreciation, due to the informational function of law and status
concerns, its procedures and decision have mobilizing effects upon
third party interveners, states, groups, and “loyalists”, with, at
times, adverse effects. The mobilization of the states as third-party
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interveners in front of the Court creates a structural misbalance unfavorable to the individual applicants, while intervention of nonstate third parties in the Court’s procedures defers the alignment of
socially controversial religious symbols, such as the wearing of the
burqa with mainstream norms. Mobilization of states, groups and
loyalists in the wake of the Court’s deliberations decreases overall
social pluralism, since states and various groups benefit from using
litigation in front of the Court for purposes of the preemptive defense of the status quo and the creation of an emerging consensus,
norm-entrepreneurship and strategic cause-legitimization (in the
case of groups), and “mobilization of loyalties” (in the case of “loyalists”).
As democracy implicitly rests on the social norms of past generations, disputes over the presence of headscarves, turbans,
crucifixes, and burqas in various spaces are but minor symptoms
of the growing anxieties over the institutional and social willingness and capabilities of democracies to manage pluralism caused
by social and demographic change. This article suggests that the
European Court of Human Rights is even less willing and wellequipped to deal with the phenomenon of increased religious diversity. The Court is “damned if it doesn’t and damned if it does”:
both its self-restraint via the margin of appreciation and more activist decisions can do more harm than good, inflame what are controllable low-intensity social tensions, and create troubles where
there are initially none.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The European Court of Human Rights’s (“the Court”) jurisprudence on Article 9 freedom of religion of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”)1 is modest, but only
likely to grow, given steady increases in religious diversity.2 Within this jurisprudence, with two notable exceptions,3 the Court displayed a considerable deference toward Council of Europe (“CoE”)
member states’ regulations of religious symbols by relying on the
doctrine of the margin of appreciation,4 particularly in cases in1
See Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (codifying
“the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”).
2
For a discussion of reasons behind the Court’s modest Article 9 jurisprudence, see, e.g., Tom Lewis, What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court,
and the Margin of Appreciation, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 395, 397–401 (2007) (arguing
that the Court accords low priority to Article 9 because religion has little relevance
for the effective operation of political democracy, the Court’s primary concern);
Aaron R. Petty, Religion, Conscience, and Belief in the European Court of Human
Rights, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 807, 825–44 (2016) (discussing various historical, conceptual, and doctrinal reasons behind the Court’s reluctance to engage
with the question of religion); Asim Jusic, Constitutional Changes and the Incremental Reductions of Collective Religious Freedom in Hungary, 10 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L.
199, 200–01 and accompanying notes (2016) (arguing that the varied social background of CoE states and the consequent lack of a coherent methodology for deciding freedom of religion cases has hindered the development of Article 9 jurisprudence).
3
See Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) [hereinafter
Ahmet
Arslan],
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237
[https://perma.cc/3QDY-2XPC] (holding that the punishment of persons participating in a public parade wearing distinct religious clothing violates Article 9);
Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10,
36516/10,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2013)
[hereinafter
Eweida],
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-115881
[https://perma.cc/HDB6-KWT4]
(finding the prohibition of wearing of religious necklace to be a violation of rights
under Article 9). In Eweida the Court held there is disproportionate interference
with individual religious belief once the private employer, an airline company,
requests an employee (Eweida), to remove a discreet cross; but no interference
when the public employer, the state hospital, requested virtually the same of the
second applicant (Chaplin). Another possible exception includes Hamidović v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 57792/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-5933801-7581160
[https://perma.cc/GKN2-96R5] (finding that state authorities exceeded the margin of appreciation when a member of the Wahhabi/Salafi Islamic group was
fined for contempt of court after refusing to remove his skullcap while witnessing,
and the fine was later commuted to imprisonment). The latter judgment is not
final at the time of finalization of this article.
4
The margin of appreciation is basically a doctrine of judicial restraint de-
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volving Muslim women.5 When using the margin of appreciation
in these cases, the Court has rarely balanced the interests of states
and the rights of individuals. Rather, as in many other instances,
the Court has relied upon the margin of appreciation to please the
states vigorously and with zeal.6
Such zealousness was at times too much for scholars, who responded mostly with criticism to the Court’s interpretation of the
margin of appreciation in three groundbreaking cases involving religious symbols: Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, where the Court supported
the Turkish prohibition of headscarves worn by a university student on account of political threats to Turkey’s constitutional secularism;7 Lautsi v. Italy Grand Chamber decision, which, contrary to
veloped by the Court to defer to the judgment of the state in evaluating factual
situations and applying the provisions of international human rights treaties. It
looms large in cases involving the freedom of religion. See YUTAKA ARAI, THE
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR, 2–3, 92–99 (2001) (providing background information on the margin of appreciation doctrine). Its use by the Court is usually
traced back to a historical case, see Handyside v. UK App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct.
H.R. para. 49 (1976) (“The domestic margin of appreciation . . . goes hand in hand
with a European supervision.”). Under various guises and names, the margin of
appreciation is used in multiple international decision-making bodies and courts,
and its application is marked by the judicial deference to authorities and the foggy
doctrinal contours. See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 909–10 (2005) (detailing characteristics of the margin of appreciation doctrine).
5 For a general critical overview of the Court’s unfavorable treatment of religious symbols, see generally Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In
Search of a European Answer, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2669 (2009). For a discussion on
the application of the margin of appreciation in cases involving Muslim women,
see, e.g., Tom Lewis, supra note 2, at 405–09 (detailing why the Court gave leeway
to state restrictions on religious expression by Muslim women in Turkey); Melanie
Adrian, The Principled Slope: Religious Freedom and the European Court of Human
Rights, 45 RELIG. ST. SOC’Y 174 (2017) (examining the Court’s application of the
margin of appreciation in four cases involving headscarves and veil in public
spaces).
6
For a critique of the use of margin of appreciation as a method of the
Court’s avoidance of conflict with the states, see Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 851–53
(1999) (describing how the Court’s “consensus doctrine enjoys considerable support among legal commentators,” and why this support is flawed). Even those
sympathetic to the margin of appreciation do not find Court’s application of the
doctrine faultless. See generally Dominic McGoldrick, A Defence of the Margin of
Appreciation and an Argument for Its Application by the Human Rights Committee, 65
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 21 (2016).
7
See generally Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173 (2005) [hereinafter
Sahin], http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70956 [https://perma.cc/PU23X6YW]. For a voluminous literature criticizing the Sahin judgment, see Rorive, su-
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the holding of the court’s Second Chamber in Lautsi v. Italy , deferred to the traditional display of the Catholic cross in Italian public schools;8 and in SAS v. France, a case in which the Court found
that the margin of appreciation and the requirements of “living together” justified the 2011 French law banning the burqa (full-face
veil) in all public spaces.9
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is a result of the
Court’s understandable preference for conflict aversion, a manifestation of the Court’s partially secondary and supervisory role in
the face of pluralism of state interests, and the variety evident
within states’ institutional and social backgrounds.10 While its
positive sides, doctrinal faults and negative impact on the general
duty of international human rights tribunals to provide meaningful
protection to those in need are well covered,11 there are very few
pra note 5, at n.61.
8
See generally Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) [hereinafter
Lautsi
I],
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-95589
[https://perma.cc/DWA5-S6MY]; see also Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06,
2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61 (2011) [hereinafter Lautsi Grand Chamber],
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104040
[https://perma.cc/K33G-FGGY]
(finding that the state-installed cross in a public school in Italy was a passive historical symbol which the state is free to erect). For a critique of the application of
the margin of appreciation in the Lautsi Grand Chamber decision, see generally
Giulio Itzcovich, One, None and One Hundred Thousand Margins of Appreciations:
The Lautsi Case, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2013).
9
See generally S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341 (2014) [hereinafter
SAS], http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466 [https://perma.cc/EXL3B532]. For criticism of the French prohibitions of burqa in public space, see, e.g.,
Armin Steinbach, Burqas and Bans: The Wearing of Religious Symbols under the European Convention of Human Rights, 4 CAMB. J. INT’L & COMP. L 29 (2015) (examining
the French burqa ban in light of the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence on the
wearing of religious symbols and arguing that the margin of appreciation does
not justify the expansion of legitimate aims of restriction allowed under Article 9
of the Convention); Myriam Hunter-Henin, Living Together in an Age of Religious
Diversity: Lessons from Baby Loup and SAS, 4 OXFORD J. L. & RELIG. 94 (2015) (criticizing the use of the margin of appreciation in SAS but finding that the judgment
takes a balanced approach that charts new paths for renegotiating the place of religion in Europe).
10
See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 846 (“The percolation of the doctrine into
areas devoid of security consideration . . . reflected an altogether different philosophy, one which is based on notions of subsidiarity and democracy and which
significantly defers to the wishes of each society to maintain its unique values and
address its particular needs.”).
11
For a voluminous list of literature discussing the margin of appreciation
doctrine, see Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts:
Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights—Or Neither?, 79 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, n. 46 (2016); McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 37–38 (detailing
critiques about the margin of appreciation doctrine).
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studies that provide an in-depth discussion of links between the
causes behind the Court’s use of the margin of appreciation in
cases involving religious symbols, the Court’s behavior and the social consequences of the two.12 Here, this link is discussed from the
interdisciplinary perspective of the sociology of international law
and tribunals13 and the sociology of law and religion.14 It is hoped
that such an interdisciplinary approach will provide novel perspectives on the macro- and micro-interdependencies between the international tribunals, state behavior, and the legal and non-legal
regulation of social processes affected by religion as a social fact.
Several arguments are presented. Overall, the margin of appreciation can be seen as the Court’s status-seeking mechanism,
whose application varies with the status of states, and the social
status and distance of religious symbols from the mainstream social norms. Irrespective of its restraint through the margin of appreciation, due to the informational function of law and concerns
regarding status, the Court’s procedures have mobilizing effects
upon third party interveners, states, religious and non-religious
groups, and “loyalists,” with, at times, negative consequences. The
mobilization of the states as third-party interveners in front of the
Court creates a structural misbalance unfavorable to the individual
applicants, while intervention of non-state third parties in the
Court’s procedures increases applicants’ social distance from the
mainstream by deferring the alignment of socially controversial
symbolic religious practices—such as burqas—with mainstream
norms. Mobilization of states, groups and loyalists prior to and in
the aftermath of the Court’s deliberations decreases overall social
12 For exceptions, see Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 847 (arguing, without specifically focusing on religious symbols, that minorities, including religious ones, are
the main victims of the Court’s liberal use of the margin of appreciation); Lewis,
supra note 2, at 409 (noting that the Court’s reliance on the margin of appreciation
in the Sahin case resulted in a disregard of the individual circumstance and the
behavior of the applicant).
13
See Karen J. Alter et al., How Context Shapes the Authority of International
Courts, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2016) (examining how the formal legal authority of international courts evolves into a de facto authority); see generally Mikael R.
Madsen, Towards a Sociology of International Courts (Danish Nat’l Res. Found. Ctr.
Excell. Int’l Cts., Working Paper No, 1, 2013) (analyzing international courts from
the perspective of classical sociological theories).
14 See James T. Richardson, The Sociology of Religious Freedom: A Structural and
Socio-Legal Analysis, 67 SOC. RELIG. 271 (2006) (providing a structural and sociolegal analysis which examines the historical, sociological, and cultural factors that
explain the outcome of legal cases involving the religious freedom of minority
groups).
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pluralism, since states and various groups—religious and nonreligious alike—benefit, using the litigation in front of the Court for
purposes of the preemptive defense of the status-quo and the creation of an emerging consensus (as in the case of high-status states
promoting burqa ban across Europe), norm-entrepreneurship and
strategic cause-legitimization (in the case of groups), and “the mobilization of loyalties” (in the case of “loyalists”).
This paper builds on and contributes to several strands of research: literature on informational function of law and compliance
with decisions of the international tribunals that generally lack coercive power,15 previous research pointing out the relative ineffectiveness and undesirable effects of international human rights
norms,16 literature arguing that human rights treaties have mobilizing effects on domestic constituencies,17 and the sociology of law
and religion.18 The main added value of the paper is twofold: Firstly, it gives a sociological perspective of the relationship between
the margin of appreciation as the expression of the Court’s status

15 See Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1043 (2005) (advancing the theory of “expressive adjudication” to explain
compliance with decisions of the tribunals that lack the power of sanctions); Tom
Ginsburg & Richard McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of
International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2004) (using a set of
expressive theories of law to explain compliance with decisions of the International Court of Justice, which has no real power to independently impose sanctions); Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2008) (theorizing that international tribunals that lack coercive
power provide information that can be used to increase voluntary compliance
with international law).
16
See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
YALE L. J. 1935 (2001) (supplying evidence that the ratification of human rights
treaties by less democratic nations can lead to a worsening of the actual level of
the protection of human rights); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui,
Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC.
1373 (2005) (suggesting that, in the aftermath of accession to human rights treaties,
governments occasionally decrease the effective level of the protection of human
rights); Andrew T. Guzman & Katerina Linos, Human Rights Backsliding, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 603 (2014) (arguing that, in the aftermath of the attachment to international human rights norms and treaties, states that are otherwise strongly
committed to human rights decrease the domestic protection of human rights).
17
See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).
18
Treatment of minority religions in the Court was rarely in focus of the sociologist of law. But see generally James T. Richardson & Jennifer Shoemaker, The
European Court of Human Rights, Minority Religions, and the Social Construction of
Religious Freedom, in THE CENTRALITY OF RELIGION IN SOCIAL LIFE 103–16 (Eileen
Barker ed., 2008).
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concerns, the status of the CoE States, and states’ regulation of nonmainstream religious symbols and social norms as domestic causes
of mobilizations in the wake of the Court’s decisions. Secondly, it
highlights the undesirable effects of mobilizations of states, third
party interveners, and domestic constituencies in the name of human rights.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The argument in
Section 2 is that the Court’s own status concerns are the main reason for the margin of appreciation being frequently used in cases
involving religious symbols, and that, in using it, the Court differentiates between high- and low-status states and high- and lowstatus religious symbols and social norms. Section 3 argues that
the informational value of the Court’s decisions has mobilizing effects on states, groups, third party interveners in front of the Court,
and, in addition, upon the “loyalists,” and lays out the downsides
and negative effects of such mobilizations. In light of arguments
laid out in Section 2 and 3, Section 4 discusses implications, critically assesses the process of the Court’s sliding further toward the
relativistic status-based considerations, and questions the Court’s
willingness and capability to act as an arbiter in disputes involving
religious symbols in societies marked by increasing religious diversity.
2. THE COURT’S STATUS AND THE MARGIN OF
APPRECIATION
Somewhat like other international tribunals, the Court has no
mechanism for direct enforcement of its decisions.19 Rather, the
19 Cf. Guzman, supra note 15, at 179 (“[W]hen a state loses before an international tribunal, no formal legal structure exists to enforce the ruling. The assets of
the noncompliant state will not be seized, nobody will be arrested, and the state
will not even lose its ability to file complaints.”). In the case of the Convention, in
accordance with its Article 46, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers has
the authority to supervise the execution of the Court’s judgments. This Committee of Ministers consists of Ministers of Foreign of Affairs of 47 Council of Europe
countries. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, About the Committee of Ministers (2016),
http://www.coe.int/web/cm/about-cm [https://perma.cc/7G3Z-BPHJ] (“The
Committee of Ministers also supervises the execution by member states of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.”). Nevertheless, the ultimate
power of execution of the Court’s judgments rests with the states themselves, and
the 11,018 cases pending before the Committee of Ministers as of 2013 due to the
lack of full compliance with and execution of the Court’s judgments by states

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018

570

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 39:3

practical impact of Court’s decisions relies to a large extent on the
consent and the willingness of sovereign intermediaries (CoE
states) to comply. There are behavioral and doctrinal implications
of this state of affairs: The Court recognized its own structural limitations and developed the doctrine of judicial restraint, the margin
of appreciation,20 which partially derives its justification from 19th
century theories of state consent as a cornerstone of international
law.21 In what follows, I discuss the Court’s strategic and tactical
use of the margin of appreciation for the purpose of increasing its
status in cases involving religious symbols.
2.1. The Court’s Status Concerns
International tribunals have been studied in order to explain
states’ compliance with their decisions in the absence of sanctions.22 One theory is that international tribunals rely on the inshows that the Court’s authority is in crisis. See Mikael Madsen, The Challenging
Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy to
the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 173 Figure 6
(2016) (displaying a rising number of cases before the Committee of Ministers
since 1996).
20 On the structural concept of the margin of appreciation, see George Letsas,
Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 705, 706 (2006)
(introducing a novel analysis of the margin of appreciation doctrine).
21
See Susanna Mancini, The Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism
Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 6, 25 (2010)
(“[T]he doctrine of the margin of appreciation derives its justification primarily
from the 19th century theories of state consensus . . . .”). Theoretically, once the
initial consent of states is secured, the international human rights tribunals can be
considered as non-consensual mechanisms that have, at the very least, eroded the
principle of the sovereign consent. See Laurence Helfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 86–87 (2008) (describing nonconsensual international lawmaking applied to human rights issues). Practically, however,
state consent still remains the cornerstone, as states can restrain the influence of
international tribunals. See Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L.
747, 787 (2012) (“The lesson from the ICJ can be generalized to other tribunals. In
one way or another, states cabin the influence of tribunals and preserve the central
role of consent.”). The relationship between consent and consensus is a vexed issue, but for the purposes of this paper, following Dzehtsiarou, the term “European consensus” means a continuously updated consent of States party to the Convention.
See KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU, EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 149 (2015) (defining “European consensus”).
22 See McAdams, supra note 15, at 1103, n. 196 (surveying literature finding a
high level of state compliance with decisions of international tribunals); see also
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formational function of their decisions and rulings in order to influence the behavior of states. The information they convey may
assist the parties in resolving a dispute in a mutually acceptable
way. It may also inform the state parties to the cases, as well as
third parties, on the violation of law, with potential reputational
and reciprocal consequences for a state violator or potential violator, with a caveat that the (potential) violator, given lack of coercive mechanisms, faces no immediate costs as a result of violation.23
However, the Court claims its task is more ambitious because
the Convention is a network of obligations that should be collectively enforced by the CoE states.24 Although the Court primarily
decides upon disputes involving individuals and states, its decisions, which, technically speaking, do not have an erga omnes effect,
potentially have wider social effects, and the justices at the Court
believe they do exert de facto influence well beyond the immediate
dispute and affect the application of domestic law in similar cases
across the CoE states.25
Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 15, at 1233–34 and 1310–11 (showing that, in
spite of the lack of enforcement power, the International Court of Justice managed
to secure a high rate of compliance with its decisions). Additionally, see David S.
Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L. J. 723, 725–26 (2009)
(surveying literature on compliance with constitutional courts and informal tribunals’ decisions in the absence of state sanctions).
23
See Guzman, supra note 15, at 180–82 (detailing the “two kinds of information dissemination that might allow a tribunal to influence states.”).
24
See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No 5310/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 239
(1978), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57506 [https://perma.cc/3JRD64UE] (“[T]he Convention . . . creates . . . a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which . . . benefit from a ‘collective enforcement’.”).
25
Formally speaking, judgments of the Court are only binding for the states
involved in the case. See Council of Europe, supra note 1, art. 46(1) (“The High
Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in cases
to which they are parties.”). However, the Court has stated on multiple occasions
that its “judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought before the
Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted
by the Convention . . .. Although the primary purpose of the Convention system is
to provide individual relief, its mission is also to determine issues on publicpolicy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising the general standards of
protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout
the community of Convention States.” See Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R
199,
para.
26,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61263
[https://perma.cc/Z4HU-RF5P]. For a nuanced discussion on the Court’s decisions as a potential source of de facto erga omnes obligations, see Dean Spielmann,
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Systems of
Europe, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1231,
1246 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo eds., 2012) (“. . .even though the judgments
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In light of these claims, this article starts from three premises:
Firstly, in the absence of direct enforcement mechanisms, the Court
continuously employs informational (expressive) influence of its
decisions to increase its authoritative status (a de facto authority).26
Secondly, when it comes to cases involving religious symbols, the
Court interacts with internal state-religion relations, within which
states regulate religions and their symbols according to their social
status as measured by the distance from the mainstream. The
mainstream is occupied, formally or informally, by the most socially prevalent norms and/or religions, and followed by other norms
and religions whose social status decline proportionally to their
distance from the mainstream.27 Thirdly, as states and their social
backgrounds differ, in order to increase its own authoritative status
the Court ranks states into categories of “high-status states,” to
whom the Court grants greater privileges (and wider margins of
appreciation), and “low-status states,” to whom the Court grants
fewer privileges (and narrower margins of appreciation). The privileges among states are attributable to who states are, and not necessarily to what they do (i.e. state performance).28
of the ECtHR do not, legally speaking, have erga omnes effect, the interpretation
chosen by the ECtHR in a particular case has a de facto relevance for the subsequent application of the domestic law in all similar pending or parallel cases”);
Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change:
Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77, 78 (2014) (“Nevertheless,
many [international courts’] rulings have—or purport to have—erga omnes effects. . ..”).
26
The expressive power of law lies in its ability to have effect and occasionally generate compliance by what it says and what sort of social information it
provides independent of sanctions. See McAdams, supra note 15 at 1045–49
(providing theoretical explanations as to why people obey laws and courts). For
the purposes of this article, the authoritative status of the Court means its de facto
authority. It is more than merely a state’s compliance with the Court’s instructions, as it includes interaction with wider social norms, and is independent of the
question of the legitimacy of the Court. Cf. Alter et al., supra note 13, at 7 (explaining that de facto authority of international courts “has two key components—(1)
recognizing an obligation to comply with court rulings and (2) engaging in meaningful action pushing toward giving full effect to those rulings.”).
27 Compare Richardson, supra note 14, at 277 (Table 1). Richardson ranks religions in a vertical hierarchy, whereas in this work religions and social norms are
placed on a horizontal scale.
28 The language of status is implicit in descriptions of the margin of appreciation since, when relying on the margin of appreciation, the Court gives weight to
national interest not because of the arguments in dispute, but out of respect for
national governments—that is, not because of what but because of who. See TORINGE HARBO, THE FUNCTION OF PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS IN EUROPEAN LAW 70
(2015). Prior works have relied on the concept of reputation rather than status to
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The Court can increase its own status by using various judicial
tactics, of which the margin of appreciation is arguably one.29
However, by doing so, the Court’s authoritative status remains uncertain relative to that of states, as the Court remains captive to the
threats of non-compliance, including the ultimate threat of retaliatory exit (e.g., the disgruntled state(s) leaving the Convention as a
result of disagreement with Court’s decisions and jurisdiction).30
explain Court’s behavior. See Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of
Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 115, 116 and note 1 (2011) (“The ECHR does not
have an effective mechanism to enforce its judgments. . . In order to obtain higher
compliance rates with its judgments, including those that enable it to promote its
preferences the ECHR seeks to increase its reputation .”). While reputation, status, and legitimacy are often indistinguishable, the distinction between reputation
and status is that reputation rests on differences in quality or past and present
performance and observable behavior, while status captures differences in privileges not related to performance. See Alessandro Piazza & Fabrizio Castellucci,
Status in Organization and Management Theory, 40 J. MGMT. 287, 292–93 (2014) and
the literature cited therein (“. . .reputation captures differences in quality or merit
generating performance-based rewards, status captures differences in agreed-on
social ranks generating privileges not related to performance.”). Status, for the
purposes of this article, means higher or lower legal privileges that reflect power
differences among states, and also among social actors within states, and are only
partially related to performance. Irrespective of the widespread use of the concept of status in the social sciences and the slow march towards nonconsensualism in international law, the consent view based on a principle of sovereign equality is still a dominant (though not uncontested) paradigm in international law scholarship, and few recent works have systematically questioned its
continued relevance and attempted to analyze international law using the concept
of status. See John J. Chung, Customary International Law as Explained by Status Instead of Contract, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 609 (2012) (arguing that the statusoriented theory, rather than the predominant consent/contract view, offers a better explanation of the formation and functioning of customary international law);
Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods,
108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014) (discussing the gradual decline of consent as a cornerstone of international law); Armin Steinbach, The Trend Towards NonConsensualism in Public International Law: A (Behavioural) Law and Economics Perspective, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 643 (2016) (exploring the application of behavioral economics and rational choice theory to formats of non-consensualism).
29 See Dothan, supra note 28, at 122–33 (discussing various judicial tactics the
Court uses to increase its reputation).
30
As to threats of exiting the Convention, British political elites, including
prime ministers, have protested that the Court’s judgments are damaging to British interests and sovereignty, and have argued that the United Kingdom should
leave the Convention. Insiders criticized this position, arguing that leaving the
Convention is harmful to the state’s international standing, and unnecessary given its ability to restrict the impact of the Convention. See Anushka Asthana &
Rowena Mason, UK Must Leave European Convention on Human Rights, Says Theresa
May,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
25,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/25/uk-must-leave-europeanconvention-on-human-rights-theresa-may-eu-referendum
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Examples discussed below aim to show how, in cases involving religious symbols, the Court’s application of the margin of appreciation varies with the status of the state.
2.2. High-Status States and the Expansion of Compliance
Whereas the reputation of a state is dependent on its performance as measured by human rights standards, the high status of
the state is marked by the privileges it enjoys as the party in spite
of its performance. The aftermath of France’s 2004 prohibition of
religious attire (turbans and headscarves) in schools illustrates the
impact of the status of a state on its treatment in the Court. Once a
group of French Sikh and Muslim pupils affected by the prohibition addressed the Court, the Court held that an application was
inadmissible, as it fell under the margin of appreciation enjoyed by
French state.31 Deliberating on the same issue at the request of a
French Sikh pupil—Bikramjit Singh—the U.N. Human Rights
Committee (UNHRC) found that a prohibition disproportionally,
and without a real explanation, violated an individual’s right to
manifest religion.32 However, France simply refused to implement
[https://perma.cc/Z87U-UGHX].
31
Aktas v. France, App. No. 43563/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237
[https://perma.cc/Y3Y7-5UCM]; Bayrak v. France, App. No. 14308/08, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
(2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237
[https://perma.cc/A39T-TBCA]; Gamaleddyn v. France, App. No. 18527/08, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237
[https://perma.cc/9UBC-R9Q4]; Ghazal v. France, App. No. 29134/08, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
(2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237
[https://perma.cc/JB4J-FLQH]; Jasvir Singh v. France, App. No. 25463/08, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237
[https://perma.cc/L3TH-82YK]; Ranjit Singh v. France, App. No. 27561/08, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2801594-3071237
[https://perma.cc/AQ2W-M34H] (holding that all applications were inadmissible).
32
H.R. Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (106th session) concerning Communication No. 1852/2008, U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008
(Feb.
4,
2013),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=CCPR/C/106/D/185
2/2008 [https://perma.cc/B8RH-233Z].In the Mann Singh case, the Court similarly declared inadmissible the application of a practicing Sikh required to remove
his turban for identity photographs for a driver’s license. See Mann Singh v
France,
App.
No.
24479/07,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2008),
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the decision of the UNHRC.33 Conscious of this development, the
Court did not seek to improve its status by means of aligning its
opinion with the UNHRC. Rather, the Court perceived France’s
defiance in the face of the UNHRC as a threat that its future decision will not be complied with by a state which the Court considers
its ally, consequently negatively affecting the Court’s status.34 For
this reason, relying on the margin of appreciation, the Court later
continued its previous policy and supported the French general
ban of burqas in public spaces35 and the almost general prohibition
of headscarves in the workplace.36
The high-status states seldom endanger the Court’s status
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-89848
[https://perma.cc/979Q-2U76].
However, The UNHRC, deliberating on the request of Mann Singh on a virtually
identical claim (identity photographs for a passport), again in opposition to the
Court, later found that such a measure, without explanation, is not necessary for
guaranteeing public safety, and violates an individual’s right to manifest his religion as guaranteed by Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See H.R. Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee under article
5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (108th session) concerning Communication No. 1928/2010
(July
8-26,
2013),
http://undocs.org/CCPR/C/108/D/1928/2010
[https://perma.cc/4HHT-2RQ5] at 347-359. Though the decisions (“Views”) of
the UNHRC are technically not binding judgments, they arguably still have legal
consequences, as the States who are parties to the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have an obligation to take them
into consideration in good faith. On the relevance of the UNHRC Views in three
cases involving Sikh religious symbols, see Nikolaos Sitaropoulos, States are Bound
to Consider the UN Human Rights Committee’s Views in Good Faith, OXFORD HUM.
RTS. HUB BLOG (Mar. 11, 2015), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/states-are-bound-toconsider-the-un-human-rights-committees-views-in-good-faith/
[https://perma.cc/MXP6-SBCX]. To illustrate the influence of the UNHRC’s
opinions, consider that U.S. federal courts have held that the UNHRC’s opinions
represent the persuasive authority for purposes of interpreting the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. David Sloss, Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (2006).
33
On France’s refusal to consider and implement the UNHRC’s views in
cases involving Sikh religious symbols, see Sitaropoulos, supra note 32. For a detailed discussion of the different treatment of Sikh religious symbols in French
residence and identity documents and in schools by the Court and the UNHRC,
see McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 46-52.
34
See Dothan, supra note 28, at 135 (finding that the Court’s credibility suffers great damage if the high-reputation state threatens to refuse compliance with
the Court’s decision).
35
Esther Erlings, ‘The Government Did Not Refer to It’: SAS v. France and Ordre Public at the European Court of Human Rights, 16 MELB. J. INT’L L. 587, 606 &
n.124 (2015).
36
Ebrahimian v. France, App. No. 64846/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158878 [https://perma.cc/R93M-W5RQ].
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through explicit or implicit threats of non-compliance for a simple
reason: as is often pointed out, through mutual understanding and
the occasional exchange of arguments, the practices of high-status
states and the Court eventually align in such a way as to confirm
the Court’s authority.37
However, a closer look at the process of increasing the Court’s
authoritative status reveals that, at least when it comes to regulation of religion, this is a process in which the high-status states are,
in fact, directing the Court. Consider the flow of cases emanating
from Switzerland, some of which involved religious symbols. In
Dahlab v. Switzerland, the issue was whether firing a teacher who
insisted on wearing a headscarf while working in a primary school
in Switzerland violated her freedom of religion. During the proceedings, the teacher, Ms. Dahlab, pointed to the fact that she had
been working with a headscarf for more than five years prior to being fired with no disturbance to the religious harmony in the
school composed of a wide range of nationalities accustomed to
diversity and tolerance, and without complaints from pupils or
parents. The Court took note of Dahlab’s prior conversion from
Catholicism to Islam and, unable to find empirical evidence of the
impact of her behavior on others, felt compelled to engage theological and sociological considerations, arguing that:
The Court accepts that it is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external symbol such as the wearing of
a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and religion of very young children . . . it cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind
of proselytizing effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed
on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran
and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square
with the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears
difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf
with the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above
all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a
democratic society must convey to their pupils.38
37
See, e.g., Madsen, supra note 19, at 164–66 (discussing the interplay between the Court and the French judicial and political elites, which eventually, according to Madsen, resulted in the Court’s extensive authority in France).
38
Dahlab
v.
Switzerland,
2001-V
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2011),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-22643”]}
[https://perma.cc/XX56-ZNSZ].
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In the aftermath of this inadmissibility decision largely based
on the margin of appreciation, the Court later also declared as inadmissible a challenge to the 2009 Swiss constitutional amendment
which, after a controversial popular referendum, prohibited the
building of minarets, arguing that the applicants could not claim to
be the victims of a violation of the Convention.39 The fact of a
popular referendum and constitutional amendment—an ultimate
signal of the prevalent social consensus—likely emboldened the
Court to continue supporting Switzerland’s regulation of religious
rights in the educational context, a policy which was precipitated
by the Court’s decision in the Dahlab case.40
Hence, while the Court might exhibit deference to high-status
states due to a credible threat of non-compliance, this does not fully explain why the Court does this in such a consistent way and
why it relies on sociological evaluations (as in Dahlab). It appears
that disputes involving a high-status state and religious symbols
that are lacking in cultural intimacy with the mainstream social
norms and that are of lower cultural status41 basically present an
opportunity for the Court to enhance its own status. The Court can
use its discretion and resort to the margin of appreciation (or other
procedural devices) as a way of disregarding the evidence and justifying results unfavorable to the members of non-mainstream and
unpopular religions42 without risks and with prospective status
gains for the following reasons: On one hand, benevolently disregarding minority norms carries little risk to the Court’s status visà-vis the high-status states. On the other, the Court’s prospective
status will increase, since in the future, high-status states will, if
implicitly, act in compliance with Court’s jurisprudence, given that
they have received a “blank check” in advance.
39
Ouardiri v. Switzerland, App. No. 65840/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105619
[https://perma.cc/FL2T-HP8M];
Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse & Others v. Switzerland, App. No. 66274/09, Eur.
Ct.
H.R
(2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105618
[https://perma.cc/UJX8-KZU9].
40 See, e.g., Osmanoglu and Kocabas v. Switzerland, App. No. 29086/12, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2017) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-170346”]}
[https://perma.cc/AWS6-9YLG] (holding that the mandatory mixed-gender
swimming classes in schools override the religiously-grounded objections of Muslim parents).
41
The use of law increases with a decrease in cultural intimacy (relational
distance). DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 41 (1976).
42
Judicial discretion abounds in cases involving socially unpopular religions. See Richardson, supra note 14, at 287–88.
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In sum, when state preference and signals of social consensus
clearly label certain religious symbols as socially controversial and
marginal, the Court is not just leaving a space of free action to the
high-status states; it is preemptively increasing this space and its
own status.43
2.3. Low-Status States and the Selective Margin of Appreciation
What differentiates high- and low-status states is that the latter,
for various reasons, cannot expect deference from the Court in
most cases. The reasons for the Court possibly considering a state
to be low-status partially depend on state performance and (non)compliance with the Court’s decision(s). Consider the following
examples: Richardson has previously hypothesized that the Court
has “double standards” and a tendency to find violations of Article
9 in disputes involving Russia more frequently than it does with
countries like France that enjoy deference under the margin of appreciation.44 Since Russia has been consistently non-compliant
with the Court’s decisions finding it in violation of Article 9,45 this
likely led the Court to perceive it as a low-status state. The predictability of Russia’s non-compliance made the impact of defiance
upon the Court’s status negligible,46 whereas, as noted above, the
Court perceives the impact of the French threat of non-compliance
on the Court’s status as credible, due to its perception of France as
its ally.
However, poor performance which might motivate the Court
to consider a state to be of low status does not explain significant
variations in the Court’s behavior towards the low-status states.
43 In a sense, rulings of the Court are similar to rulings of other international
tribunals: a means by which states can increase their influence and legitimize already-made decisions. See Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: SelfBinding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 75 (2008) (“If, instead of following controversy, scholars followed the litigants, they would be
writing more about [international courts] involvement in private–public dispute
adjudication, enforcement, and administrative review, and about how most of
these rulings are exactly what states hoped for when they delegated authority to
[international courts].”).
44 James T. Richardson & Jennifer Shoemaker, supra note 18, at 106 & 114.
45 James T. Richardson & Brian M. Lee, The Role of the Courts in the Social Construction of Religious Freedom in Central and Eastern Europe, 39 REV. CENT. EAST EUR.
L. 291, 302 (2014).
46 Dothan, supra note 28, at 117 & 136.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1

2018]

The European Court’s Margin of Appreciation

579

Even countries which, in the eyes of the Court, likely have a low
status due to low compliance and a high number of cases lodged
against them can temporarily enjoy a selective (topical) margin of
appreciation similar to that of high-status states for reasons of who
they are. Between 1987 and 2001, the Court considered roughly
2,400 cases filed against Turkey, finding at least one violation of the
Convention in eighty-seven percent of those cases. From the total
number of all judgments finding violations of the Convention,
around 1,700 were not fully implemented as of 2012, making Turkey one of the countries least compliant with the Court’s decisions.47 Nevertheless, despite this record, and until recently, the
Court consistently deferred to the Turkish constitutional principle
of secularism whenever the dispute involved religious symbols.
On the grounds of the margin of appreciation, the Court upheld
the limitation on wearing headscarves on secondary school students,48 university students attempting to finish their studies or
make university identity photos,49 and university professors.50
In the Sahin judgment, the Grand Chamber, echoing sociological and theological considerations from the Dahlab case, clearly
pointed out that the Court's reliance on the margin of appreciation
should be viewed in relation to who the state party to the case is
and in the wider Turkish historical and social context, noting that:
[T]he Court considers that, when examining the question of
the Islamic headscarf the Turkish context, it must be borne
in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, which is
presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may
have on those who choose not to wear it . . . in a country in
which the majority of the population, while professing a
strong attachment to the rights of women and a secular way
of life, adhere to the Islamic faith. Imposing limitations on
freedom in this sphere may, therefore, be regarded as meeting a pressing social need . . . this religious symbol has takMadsen, supra note 19, at 164 & n.166.
Köse & 93 Others v. Turkey, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 339 (2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_2006-II.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F5DV-DLCQ].
49
Sahin, supra note 7; Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
(1993),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-86170”]}
[https://perma.cc/X6UD-LGUE].
50
Kurtulmus v. Turkey, 2006-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 297 (2006).,
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-88325”]}
[https://perma.cc/K2HV-AWHQ].
47
48
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en on political significance in Turkey in recent years. . . .
there are extremist political movements in Turkey which
seek to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols
and conception of a society founded on religious precepts.51
The Court’s generous use of the margin of appreciation in the
case of religious symbols in Turkey can be likened only to the
Court’s similar stance toward the regulation of religious symbols
in France.52 This, however, does not imply that the Court has a
consistent preference for secularism that is (or was) supposedly
shared by Turkey and France.53 As the difference in the Court’s
stance toward Turkey and France in the cases Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey and SAS v. France shows, for better or worse, the Court’s stance
towards Turkey has changed. This likely happened due to political
and social changes in the last decade.54 Both Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey
and SAS v. France were based on similar facts—prohibition and/or
punishment for wearing religious clothing and symbols in the public space—but the outcomes differed. According to the Court, the
French and Turkish cases can be distinguished as the burqa ban in
France was worthy of the margin of appreciation due to the fact
that it was not expressly based on the veil’s religious symbolism
but on the fact that it conceals the face,55 which implies that the ban
51
See Sahin, supra note 7, para. 115, citing first instance Chamber judgment
paras. 107-09. The extremist political movements to which the Court refers are a
reference to the Court’s case Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) & Others v. Turkey,
where the Court held that given Turkey’s special history, the dissolution of the
established Islamic political party is necessary in order to protect pluralism and a
democratic system, and therefore does not violate the Convention. See Refah
Partisi (the Welfare Party) & Others v. Turkey, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 267,
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-60936”]}
[https://perma.cc/FQ3F-CPXL]. Carving out a special treatment and granting a
wider margin of appreciation for restrictive state practices on account of the individual state’s special political and historical situation is frequently done by the
Court. See, e.g., Rekvenyi v. Hungary, App. No. 25390/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58262 [https://perma.cc/FU8E-2H9S]; Republican Party of Russia v. Russia, App. No. 12976/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104495 [https://perma.cc/KH5N-DXY7].
52 See discussion of line of cases emanating from France infra Section 3.4.
53
Stijn Smet, Freedom of Religion v. Freedom from Religion: Putting Religious
Dictates of Conscious (Back) on the Map, in THE LAUTSI PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSROOM 113, 125
(Jeroen Temperman ed., 2012).
54
On the interplay of social and political changes and religion in Turkey
from 2002 onwards, see WILLIAM HALE & ERGUN OZBUDUN, ISLAMISM, DEMOCRACY
AND LIBERALISM IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF THE AKP 68–79 (2009).
55 See SAS, supra note 9, para. 136.
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in Turkey was unjustified since it was based solely on the religious
connotations of the prohibited symbols. However, since the
French 2011 Law, banning burqas, was supported by the log of the
French parliament resolutions clearly stressing the need to defend
Republican values in the face of subversive religious threat,56 these
two cases cannot be substantively distinguished solely on these
grounds, and the primary difference seems to be the respondent
state.
Overall, despite the otherwise low status of Turkey in the eyes
of the Court, the Court might have previously treated Turkish secularism as worthy of the margin of appreciation due to its deference to high-status states in order to improve its own status of an
instrument of democratization.57 Yet recent and ongoing changes
in socio-political reality and social norms have likely pushed the
Court in a different direction. Superficially, this redirection might
appear as good news for those seeking an increased acceptance of
religious symbols in the public space and a signal of the Court’s increased permissiveness and understanding of the context and differences. However, there are more likely signals that nowadays, in
the area of religious symbols (as already the case in other areas),
the Court considers Turkey to be a low-status state whose legal
system and underlying social norms are both prone to violation of
the Convention and generally substantively differing from the
Court’s view of human rights and secularism.58

56 Id., paras. 15-17, 24-26 (detailing the background behind the French report
proposing a resolution to reassert Republican values and “condemn as contrary to
those values the wearing of a full-face veil”).
57 Madsen, supra note 19, at 163–64 (contrasting the Court’s approach to situations in Italy and Turkey to establish that its purpose varies significantly depending on the sociopolitical realities present in the specific country; the Court’s function in relation to Turkey, for example, is to propel its democratization).
58 See, i.e., Izzettin Dogan and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 62649/10, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
(2016),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-162697
[https://perma.cc/JTK6-AEE4] (finding that the Turkish state’s treatment of the
Alevi Islamic community and its places of worship is incompatible with the state
duty of neutrality and impartiality, irrespective of the fact that the unfavorable
treatment of the Alevi community was based on the requirements of secularism
which the Court upheld in cases involving headscarves) and infra Section 4.1. (arguing that the Court will be more permissive toward religious symbols and religion in general in cases when the status of the state coincides with the cultural or
social status of the symbol or religious group).
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3. MOBILIZATIONS
The Court’s application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation by definition supports the status quo and social conformism,
since the doctrine defers to national rules created with an eye on
state preferences and/or prevalent social norms and expectations.
The margin of appreciation, therefore, raises no issue of state compliance, largely because there is essentially nothing to comply with.
While this might be a straightforward impact of the margin of appreciation, the negative, positive, or neutral effects of international
tribunals depend not only on state (non)compliance but also on actions and interactions of states and domestic groups.59
In this part, it is suggested that due to the informational function of law and status concerns, the Court’s decisions have an additional mobilizing impact that explains the increase in litigation related to religious symbols and the mobilization of states and
various international and domestic constituencies during the
course of litigation and in the wake of the Court’s decisions.60 Four
types of mobilizations are discussed—mobilization of third-party
interveners, state mobilization, group mobilization, and the mobilization of loyalists—in order to show that each has, at times, adverse effects. These four types of mobilization overlap to a large
extent, but in order to clearly isolate the different effects and aspects of each, they will be discussed separately.

59
Cf. Shrima Baradaran et al., Does International Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 743, 747 (2013) (“Whether international law is ultimately effective in accomplishing its goals may depend less on whether a state complies and more on
whether sub-state entities act consistently with the goals of international law.”).
60
See SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 8–14 and 136–38. The author argues that international human rights treaties have mobilizing effects. Overall, however, the
author focuses on mobilization for compliance with human rights treaties, whereas the argument here is that the Convention is used as a tool for destructive mobilizations that do not aid the individual applicants and whose ultimate outcome
might even be antithetical to human rights. See generally Eric Posner, Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmons’s Mobilizing for Human Rights, N. Y.U. J. INT’L. L. &
POL. 819 (2012) (criticizing Simmons argument).
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3.1. Mobilization of Third-Party Interveners
Litigation involving controversial religious groups and socially
divisive religious symbols attracts third-party interveners. Such
third-party interveners are motivated by special stakes they have
in religious groups succeeding or failing in their legal claims, and
their interest increases proportionally to the public saliency of the
case.61 The hallmark of third party intervention in the Court is that
both the CoE states and non-state actors, that are not the direct parties to the case, can act as third-party interveners in the course of
litigation.62 Theoretically, third party interveners can improve the
quality of litigation in terms of supplying quality evidence and, in
the case of non-state interveners, improve, through legal aid, the
equality of arms between the (usually) underfunded applicants
and the resourceful CoE states.63 However, in the case of litigation
in the Court pertaining to religious symbols, effects of third-party
interventions are likely negative. The width and breadth of thirdparty interventions skews the process, and produces wasteful attempts at excess litigation, for the reasons elaborated below.
The CoE states are “repeat players” in front of the Court.
Helfer and Slaughter argue that states have interest in the Court’s
decisions as they use these to gradually align their national regulations with the Court’s interpretation of the Convention.64 Yet, in
cases involving contentious social issues and controversial religious symbols, a state might also have an interest in intervening in
61 Richardson, supra note 14, at 286–87 (showing the ways in which third party partisans can play a key role in defending religious freedom, or alternatively,
attacking it).
62 See European Convention on Human Rights art. 36(2), Nov. 4, 1950; see also
Rule 44(3)(a), Rules of Court at Rules of Court - European Court of Human Rights,
(2016),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/TPV9-7KB4]. For a more detailed description of the process of
the third-party intervention in the Court, see Edita Gruodytė & Stefan Kirchner,
Legal Aid for Intervenors in Proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, 2
INT’L. COMP. JURIS. 36, 40–41 (2016) (parsing the language of the Article 36(2) of the
Convention and discussing who can intervene and under what conditions).
63
See generally Gruodytė and Kirchner, supra note 62 at 40 (noting that the
legal aid is indispensable for ensuring access to justice and that “this is particularly true in instances in which the person who is in need of financial support find
him– or herself already in a structurally weaker position than the other party, for
example in cases in which a citizen faces the government.”).
64
Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 317 (1997).
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the dispute in order to sustain the status quo and prevent or
preempt a situation in which the litigation and the Court’s decision
become a focal point for a positive or negative social mobilization
of religious groups and their supporters with an interest in the
faith of a religious symbol.65 The Court can (mis)use state intervention as a signal (of dubious veracity) that indeed there exists (or
does not exist) a consensus of the states in favor of or against the
applicant’s claims, which serves as cornerstone of the Court’s margin of appreciation analysis.66
Ultimately, through the generation of sheer noise, the states
acting as third party interveners can inflate the extent of the social
controversy related to a particular religious symbol. This creates a
structural procedural imbalance for the applicant, who finds themselves outweighed by de facto multiple influential opponents, since
the Court, given its status concerns, is more cognizant of state
pressure than an individual applicant’s arguments.67
65
See Richard McAdams, Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1649, 1651 (2000) (explaining how law, through its expressive function, can provide a focal point around which individuals can coordinate their behavior). States
acting as third-party interveners in previous cases become beneficiaries of Courts’
judgment favorable to state interveners’ views in later decisions. The Belgian
government, which itself had enacted a general ban on face veils, intervened on
the side of France in support of the burqa ban; see SAS, supra note 9, paras. 86-88
(discussing the procedural history and explaining the reasoning behind the Belgian ban on face veils). Later on, relying on the theory of “living together” developed in SAS and the margin of appreciation, the Court approved the general ban
on face veils in Belgium. See Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, App. No.
37798/13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=0035788361-7361157, [https://perma.cc/UUR3-62K5]; and Dakir v. Belgium, App.
No. 4619/12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=0035788319-7361101, [https://perma.cc/W7ZD-NH5G].
66
See Helfer and Slaughter, supra note 64, at 316–17 (delineating how the
Court uses national consensus on an issue to strike a balance between deference
and independent judicial review in its margin of appreciation analysis).
67 The same conclusion, more directly based on a need to protect the right to
fair trial, is reached by Gruodytė and Kirchner, supra note 62 at 41 (arguing that it
is a government’s obligation to protect third party interests, even without their
inclusion in a trial, so their explicit participation requires an acute awareness and
addressing of the structural imbalance created for the applicant). An implication
that immediately suggests itself is that the possibility of states intervening as third
parties opens the Court to pressure and decreases its independence. For opinions
to the contrary cf. Guzman, Rational Choice Analysis, supra note 15 at 227 footnote
145 (“Other features supporting independence (of international tribunals) include
the ability of third parties to participate in the process. . .”), and Eric A. Posner &
John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 51
(2005) (suggesting that the right of third parties to intervene in a dispute can serve
as a measure of judicial independence in international tribunals).
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The Lautsi litigation is a case at point. In Lautsi I the Court,
prompted by an atheist parent complaint, held that a state-installed
cross in a public school in Italy is a “powerful external symbol”
that has no place in public schools as it undermines the confessional neutrality and pluralism with adverse effects on the rights of
children and their parents.68 After the Court’s decision provoked
widespread public resentment, in the interim period before the
Lautsi Grand Chamber decision, a consortium of governments
(Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Russian Federation, Greece, Lithuania, Malta and San Marino) intervened in the Court as third party interveners. The consortium argued that half of the European
population lives in non-secular states with various church-state arrangements, and the Court should be alerted to a possible flood of
litigation seeking prohibition of religious symbols in schools if
Lautsi I is upheld. Most of the intervening states were previously
found to be frequent violators of Article 9 of the Convention by the
Court, and some of them (i.e. Russia) had little to worry about in
relation to future litigation against them, as they habitually fail to
comply with the Court’s decisions.69
Despite their mostly weak human rights and compliance record, responding to the concentrated opposition, the Court allowed
only the intervening states to take part in oral proceedings during
the Lautsi Grand Chamber deliberations, but not the NGOs on the
side of the applicant.70 In the final Lautsi Grand Chamber judg-

68
Lautsi I, supra note 8, paras. 54-56 (describing how hanging a crucifix in a
school may be harmful to children). Although the Italian government argued that
for historical reasons and due to a lack of the European consensus on the issue of
state-promoted religious symbols in educational setting the margin of appreciation applies, the Court avoided addressing the argument, see id. para. 41. See also
Zoe Luca, Case of Lautsi v Italy: Religious symbols in public schools and the (lack of)
margin of appreciation, 17 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. COMP. L. 98, 102-04 (2010) (discussing
the implications of the Court’s lack of response to the Government’s argument
that, when interpreting the principle of secularism, states enjoy a margin of appreciation).
69 See Teresa Sanader, Religious Symbols and Garments in Public Places – a Theory for the Understanding of S.A.S. v. France, 9 VIENNA J. INT’L. CONST. L. 186, 203 note
116 (2015) (noting that “interveners are mostly the states against which a violation
of Article 9 ECHR was found in the past” and providing a list of Article 9 violators).
70
See Lautsi Grand Chamber, supra note 8, para. 8 (list of parties who were
given leave to intervene as a third party); see also Laura Van den Eynde, An Empirical Look at the Amicus Curiae Practice of Human Rights NGOs Before the European
Court of Human Rights, 31/3 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271, 273 n. 7 (2013) (“only states
were allowed to take part in the public hearings.”).
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ment, the Court ultimately corrected itself and re-described the
same state-installed cross as a passive historical symbol beyond its
reach, tacitly conceding that, when it comes to the regulation of religious symbols, states can largely expect to enjoy a margin of appreciation.71 This was an implicit recognition that, as the Italian
foreign minister succinctly put it, “the popular sentiment in Europe
had won.”72
In other words, the notice to the Court to consider background
state-backed social norms and future litigation was hardly a result
of states’ willingness to reconsider their regulation in light of the
Court’s decision. Rather, it was a warning signal to the Court. The
states and their supporters signaled that the Lautsi Grand Chamber
decision and future similar decisions, if unfavorable to the states,
would not only remain collectively unenforced by the traditional
low-status non-enforcers, and potentially by a larger group of
states, but likely provoke social mobilization in opposition to the
Court’s judgment, which would further undermine the Court’s status, since concerted collective non-compliance makes the Court
71
See Lautsi Grand Chamber, supra note 8, para. 70-72 (holding that the lack
of European consensus on the question of the presence of religious symbols and
paraphernalia in state schools calls for the margin of appreciation, and stressing
that “a crucifix on a wall is an essentially passive symbol and this point is of importance in the Court’s view,”). For a general critique of the argumentation used
in the Lautsi Grand Chamber decision, see Stanley Fish, Crucifixes and Diversity: The
Odd
Couple,
OPINIONATOR,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/crucifixes-and-diversity-theodd-couple/ [https://perma.cc/UY4N-B3QB] (“It may be the case that over the
centuries the crucifix has become allied with secular values in the sense that the
religion it represents no longer sets itself against them; but that doesn’t mean that
the crucifix, especially when installed by law in state-administered classrooms, is
no longer a Christian symbol and the bearer of a distinctly Christian message (salvation is by Christ and through the Church) non-believers might find uncomfortable and pressuring.”). For a critique of the application of the margin of appreciation in Lautsi Grand Chamber decision, see Kristin Henrard, Shifting Visions about
Indoctrination and the Margin of Appreciation Left to States, 6 RELIG. HUM. R. 245, 249–
251 (2011) (“it chooses to argue that the greater visibility of Christianity through
the crucifixes is balanced out by the fact that the school environment opens the
door up to other religions as well, once again ignoring crucial differences in terms
of duration and government imprint.”). For an opinion to the contrary, see Monica Lugato, The Margin of Appreciation and Freedom of Religion: Between Treaty Interpretation and Subsidiarity, 52 J. CATHOL. LEG. STUD. 49 (2013) (arguing that the
Court’s use of the rules on treaty interpretation and the principle of subsidiarity
provided its decision with a sound legal basis).
72
Riazat Butt, European Court of Human Rights rules crucifixes are allowed in
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
18,
2011)
state
schools,
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/mar/18/european-court-humanrights-crucifixes-allowed, [https://perma.cc/K323-RYFN].
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and the Convention redundant.73 For these reasons, a third-party
state intervention arguably serves as an early signal of the extent of
the threat of non-compliance.
The effects of the non-state third-party intervention on the side
of the applicant are different to those of when states act as thirdparty interveners in favor of other states. Many cases in the Court
draw the attention of non-state third-party interveners like NGOs
to join litigation in front of the Court, mostly on the side of the applicant, by so increasing the overall drive to litigate.74 If the dispute involves a religious symbol of considerable controversy, as
was the case with the burqa ban in SAS v. France, third party intervention by non-state actors can increase the public saliency of the
case and provide resources and a motivation to litigate.75 However, rare empirical studies show that NGOs’ third-party interventions do not seem to significantly increase an applicant’s chances of
prevailing in the Court.76 At the same time, prolonged litigation of
socially controversial religious symbols such as the burqa increases
the social distance and adversarial relations between the individual
and their environment, without any beneficial effects.77
73
For arguments to the contrary, albeit in a context of final judgments, see
Dothan, supra note 28 at 134–35 (theorizing that several low-reputation states acting jointly are unlikely to defy the Court due to free-riding concerns and publicity
required for their actions to be effective); see also Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 852
(wondering “. . . to what extent it is really possible to envision credible threats by
member States to challenge the court’s authority in reaction to unpopular judgments.”).
74
For various reasons, local and international NGOs are among the Court’s
key constituencies. See Alter et. al.., supra note 13, at 24–25 (explaining that civil
society is an important contributor to the enlargement of the Court’s authority because NGOs often file test cases, monitor suits filed by private litigants, and coordinate medium and long–term litigation strategies among litigants, attorneys, and
government officials). Third party intervention by NGOs (and other bodies) in
front of the Court is continuously increasing, particularly in recent years; see
Eynde, supra note 70, at 280 Figure 1.
75
A number of NGOs intervened on the side of the applicant seeking to
overturn the burqa ban in France; see SAS, supra note 9, paras. 89-98 (listing the
third-party interveners, including Amnesty International, ARTICLE 19, and the
Human Rights Centre of Ghent University).
76
See Eynde, supra note 70, at 292–93 (doubting the existence of a positive
correlation between NGO third–party intervention and applicant success).
77
The experience of women wearing burqas in Europe suggests that their
social position in the course of – and in the aftermath of – the litigation became
worse, not better. For example, the applicant in the SAS case experienced threats
and requested anonymity during the Court proceedings for fear of further harassment; see Eva Brems, Face Veil Bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The
Importance of Empirical Findings, 22 J. L. POL’Y 517, 524–25 (2014) (recounting true
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Overall, since the Court’s status concerns motivate it toward
valuing high-status state interests over those of an applicant with
socially distant religious practices, chances are the applicants will
end on the losing side and will eventually have to seek ways to
consensually negotiate symbolic practices with their immediate
environment. The non-state actors’ intervention on the side of applicants with socially distant religious practices likely only prolongs this process, to the detriment of the applicant.
3.2. State Mobilizations
The Court’s status concerns and the discrepancy between high
and low status of states endows the decisions of the Court with a
different informational value for high- and low-status states. Lowstatus states with weaker human rights records and a resolution to
oppose the Court have little to fear and much to gain from the
Court’s decisions. If the Court approves their rules and practices
or defers to those under the doctrine of the margin of appreciation—the effect is the same—the rules gain additional credibility as
being “in accordance with human rights standards.” In opposite
cases, costs are negligible. States’ reputations for adherence to
human rights standards will not suffer immensely since they were
weak in the first place,78 and the worst they can expect is minor
material costs.79 A good illustration is Russia’s stance toward the
decisions finding that it violated Article 9 of the Convention. Except for the payment of minuscule litigation costs and damages,
stories of how women were negatively affected in the aftermath of the litigation).
See also Alter et.al. supra note 13, at 25 (noting that NGO advocacy can be a double-edged sword).
78
The same logic holds for (non-)compliance with human rights treaties in
general. See Hathaway, supra note 16, at 2011 (“If countries may obtain reputational benefits from ratifying some treaties while suffering little reputational cost
from failing to observe the obligations assumed, countries may be substantially
more likely to fail to comply with their treaty obligations. . .it is possible that the
expressive benefit of a treaty is at its greatest for precisely those countries not already in compliance with the treaty - those countries may have more to gain, and
perhaps less to lose, than those with good practices and hence good reputation.”).
79
See ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014) at 49 and
note 7 (discussing studies showing relatively weak state compliance with the
Court’s decisions and very low litigation costs and damages awarded by the
Court). For a review of literature that claims that the Court’s decisions enjoy a
relatively high level of compliance, see Dothan, supra note 28, at 119 n. 13.
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Russia mostly refused to implement the Court’s decisions, with little or no damage to its reputation, and without leaving the CoE.80
The situation is more promising for high-status states considered staunch supporters of the Court. On average, these states
seem to eventually comply with Court’s decisions,81 however their
statuses make them less likely to suffer losses in the Court and
more likely to enjoy deference, with the effect being that the status
quo is confirmed as in line with human rights. The same status affords opportunities to continuously experiment with laws and
practices that might appear to be a performance contrary to human
rights standards before their inspection by the Court. Since low
performance has no effect on high-status states, they are in a better
position to push down the bar of human rights standards and invite others to do so.82 If the Court finds that the new practice of a
high-status state is in line with human rights standards, other
states can “jump the wagon” and, on aggregate, the result is a
spread of conformity.
An example of this process is readily available: prior to the SAS
decision, as the Court itself noted, the French position on the total
80
See Richardson and Lee, supra note 45, at 298 (“Enforcing [. . .] decisions
has been problematic [. . .] since Russia’s usual response is eventually to pay the
limited financial awards but not to change its policies and practices.”). To illustrate how the Court’s miniscule damages have no effect on the behavior of states,
consider that in response to one of the Court’s judgments awarding the sum of
3,000 EUR as a just satisfaction to the organizers of the banned gay pride parade,
one Member of the Russian Parliament proclaimed that Russia was ready to pay
3,000 Euros every year, but there would be no such parades in Moscow; see Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Alan Greene, Legitimacy and the Future of the European Court
of Human Rights: Critical Perspectives from Academia and Practitioners, 12 GER. L. J.
1707, 1709 (2011) (“Perceptions of ECtHR judgments as merely awarding just satisfaction are damaging to its effectiveness as a whole. Therefore, the importance of
general measures should be emphasized by the ECtHR, and their meaning should
be clear.”).
81 Madsen, supra note 19, at 164 et seq.
82 Cf. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, supra note 16, at 1378 (arguing that international human rights treaties “. . . may at times provide governments with a shield
for increasingly repressive behaviors after ratification, as treaty ratification confers
on them human rights legitimacy and makes it difficult for others to pressure
them for further action.”); see also Fionnuala Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity:
Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 FORDHAM INT’L. L. J. 101, 114 (1995)
(“Where ostensibly democratic states have engaged in the suspension of certain
rights guaranteed under the Convention, the Commission and Court are less exacting in their requirements.”). Guzman and Linos labeled this phenomenon
“human rights backsliding”, a tendency for states otherwise committed to the protection of human rights to weaken their domestic human rights regimes after joining human rights treaties, see Guzman and Linos, supra note 16 at 605.
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burqa ban in public spaces was a minority position in Europe.83
Once the Court affirmed that French burqa ban lay within the wide
margin of appreciation afforded to states, other countries mobilized to enact their own bans, explicitly or implicitly relying on the
Court’s decision as justification.84
What emerges from this explanation is that usual rationale behind application of margin of appreciation—the imperfect consensus among states—is misleading. The absence of state consensus is
considered to be inversely related to the margin of appreciation:
less consensus means the Court will grant larger margins to the
state-backed national social norms and vice versa.85 Yet, given the
relative diversity of the state-backed social norms amongst the CoE
states, there will always be examples available signaling the lack of
consensus. The sheer difference in social norms and institutional
architecture among the CoE states always provides some justification for deference via the margin of appreciation. If reasons of the
lack of consensus as justification for the Court’s deference would
be taken to extreme, then the Court would always have to defer to
the states.86
The explanation advanced here is that the margin of appreciation is the Court’s deflection tactic to allow it to wait for a highstatus state to make the first move, thus mobilizing other states on
the way, and sparking the creation of partial, emerging consensus87
83
See SAS, supra note 9, para. 156 (“[. . .] from a strictly normative standpoint, France is very much in a minority position in Europe: with the exception of
Belgium, no other member State of the Council of Europe has, to date, opted for
such a [ban].”).
84
See EVA BREMS, SAS V FRANCE: A REALITY CHECK 2 (2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2810221,
[https://perma.cc/3SCH-A5QZ]
(“the Grand Chamber judgment of SAS provides legal and political shelter to all
existing face covering bans across Europe, as well as to any that might still be in
the pipeline.”). For a list of legislative proposals to ban burqas in various European countries, see id. at 2, note 6. Of course, this is not to say that these countries
would not have enacted the bans in the absence of a pronouncement from the
Court.
85 See Benvenisti, supra note 6, at 851 (discussing the relationship between the
consensus and margin of appreciation doctrine).
86
The absence of a European consensus is an important–but not the only–
factor the Court takes into account when deciding whether to grant states a wider
or narrower margin of appreciation. Accordingly, as the Court claims, where “a
particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the
margin allowed to the State will normally be restricted.” See S.H. and Others v.
Austria,
App.
No.
57813/00,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
para
94 (2011)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-107325 [https://perma.cc/M73N-LLQP].
87
Cf. Dothan, supra note 28, at 135 (suggesting that the ability to influence
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through the creation of a focal point and ensuing cascades of
norms through availability.88 In the example of France’s burqa
ban, the policy of the high-status state and the Court’s confirmation of it creates the focal point by increasing the saliency and epistemic availability of the policy in public discourse, leading to a
chain reaction that later makes the policy acceptable as a result of
the internal and status-seeking motives of other states and sectors
of society within and across states. Over time, a sufficient number
of states mimicking the first mover can convince the Court that
there exists an emerging consensus (the doctrinal opposite of the
margin of appreciation)89 within CoE states’ views on a particular
policy (i.e. the burqa ban), which the Court must now take into account in order to adapt the meaning of the Convention to changing
conditions.90
other states gives influential (high reputation) states additional leverage against
the Court). The Court claims that, when identifying the emerging consensus, it
takes into account developments in many member states; see, e.g., Fabris v. France,
App.
no.
16574/08,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
para.
56
(2013)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-116716,
[https://perma.cc/H6KL-VZDC]
(“the Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting
States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to
be achieved”). However, at the same time, the Court does not necessarily disapprove of legal and social experimentation. Relying on the margin of appreciation,
the Court can tolerate a single state imposing a new restriction even if no other
state has done anything similar. In light of the absence of a European consensus,
the French burqa ban seems to have been one such experimental law approved by
the Court. See McGoldrick, supra note 6 at 30 (“It is clear that [The Court] is open
to States to impose new restrictions on rights and these may fall within the [margin of appreciation] even if other states have not imposed them.”).
88
On focal points, see McAdams, Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, supra
note 65, at 1651 (“[t]he law provides a focal point around which individuals can
coordinate their behavior[:] when individuals have a common interest in coordinating, [. . .] a legal rule may guide behavior merely by influencing expectations
about how others will behave.”). On availability cascades, see Timur Kuran &
Cass Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685
(1999) (defining availability cascades as a process through which “expressed perceptions trigger chains of [. . .] responses that make these perceptions appear increasingly plausible through their rising availability in public discourse.”).
89
See Glor v. Switzerland, App. no. 13444/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 75 (2009)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-92525
[https://perma.cc/DF6T-53H3]
(“One of the relevant factors in determining the scope of the margin of appreciation left to the authorities may be the existence or non-existence of common
ground between the laws of the Contracting States”).
90
Cf. Shai Dothan, Judicial Deference Allows European Consensus to Emerge 18
CHI. J. INT’L. LAW (forthcoming 2018) (discussing the influence of the first mover
country on policies of other countries, the relationship between the emerging consensus and the margin of appreciation, and the problems of identifying emerging
consensus in the case of burqa bans.)
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As the states are heterogeneous, the Court’s confirmation of the
first mover high-status state policy will not convince all states to
follow the same path, and those that do will likely do so for inauthentic reasons unrelated to those that motivated the first mover.
Nevertheless, the creation of an emerging consensus by the firstmover high-status state and through later mimicry by other states
ultimately increases the Court’s status, since it retroactively justifies its deference while risking one of the damaging consequences
of availability cascades: populist firestorms and sectarian tensions.91
3.3. Group Mobilizations
In and of themselves, religious symbols have very different
meanings in different contexts, and the continuum and variance of
contexts, speakers, and audiences can change the meaning of the
same symbol from purely religious to entirely secular or commercial.92 This view of symbols, however, somewhat underestimates
the social function and effects of religious symbols. Even if their
meaning is infinitely variable and ultimately secularized and emptied of their religious and historical baggage, religious symbols can
serve as credibility-enhancing group coordination signals.93 From
an external point of view, a religious symbol enhances the credibility and the visibility of the group to which a symbol belongs in a
wider social setting—the everyday appearance of a headscarf or

91 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 88, at 736. For Kuran and Sunstein, availability cascades can cause populist firestorms and are essentially a problem of democracy, as they distort and misrepresent citizens’ actual beliefs, desires, and judgments. From their point of view, courts have a role to play in preventing reactions
to availability cascades and regulating risks they create. See id.at 758–759. But
there is no reason to think that the Court and states strategically interacting and
mimicking each other’s behavior cannot have a role in perpetuating availability
cascades, especially when engaging in legal and social experimentation. As Kuran
and Sunstein acknowledge, courts are not immune to availability cascades, since
the outcome of legal cases conveys an institutional message and affects social
struggles over the meaning of legal cases. See id. 765-766.
92
For a brief overview of the possible varieties of meanings of religious
symbols, see Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale Annicchino, Cross, Crucifix, Culture: An Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confession Symbols, 13 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 71, 82–87 (2014).
93 Christian Eilinghoff, Religious Information and Credibility, 1 GER. WORK. PAP.
LAW ECON, Paper 8 (2003).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1

2018]

The European Court’s Margin of Appreciation

593

cross or burqa turns it into an acceptable social meme. From an internal point of view, religious symbols act as a mechanism for religious groups to sustain group membership by creating group
boundaries. As group boundaries are used for intra-group sustainment and intergroup differentiation, symbols are particularly
contested in times of conflict and used for purposes of group
mobilization.94 This is the polarizing effect of religious symbols:
even if those adhering to or opposing particular symbols see nothing particularly “religious” about them, symbols can easily become
focal points of conflict over social meaning and group loyalties.
From this perspective, and depending on the circumstances,
the Court’s decision can be perceived as a violation of social meaning, providing a cause for group mobilization.95 Consider the following two examples: various objections by social and political
groups that mobilized against the Court’s decisions in Lautsi I boil
down to this: Social meaning of the cross or its regulation in the
public space is not a matter for a Court to discuss, but is instead
best left to society.96 The Court succumbed and eventually confirmed this in the Lautsi Grand Chamber judgment, relying on the
margin of appreciation. Vice versa, when in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey
the Court stuck to the margin of appreciation and upheld the ban
on headscarves in Turkish universities, the decision was a cause for
group mobilization resulting in the constitutional amendment in
2008 which effectively allowed headscarves into the public educa-

94 See Jeffrey R. Seul, ‘Ours is the Way of God’: Religion, Identity, And Intergroup
Conflict, 36 J. PEACE RES. 553, 564 (1999) (“[. . .] when conflict involving one or
more religious groups does occur, the combatants may be emboldened by a sense
of religiously defined identity and purpose, and their traditions may provide a
fund of symbolic, moral, institutional, and other resources that can be used to
mobilize the group and legitimate its cause.”).
95
The impact of law depends on and affects social meaning, which Lessig
defined as “the semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context,” see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995).
96
For example, among many others, thirty-three members of the European
Parliament, acting collectively as interveners in Lautsi Grand Chamber case, argued that “the Court was not a constitutional court and had to respect the principle of subsidiarity and recognise a particularly broad margin of appreciation in
favour of Contracting States not only regarding the relationship between the State
and religion but also where they carried out their functions in the area of education and teaching . . . . [T]he display of crucifixes in public buildings did not conflict with the Convention, and the presence of religious symbols in the public
space should not be seen as a form of indoctrination but the expression of a cultural unity and identity.” See Lautsi Grand Chamber, supra note 8, para. 56.
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tional system.97 The amendment encountered short-lived resistance
by the Turkish Constitutional Court, to no avail. Prohibitions of
headscarves in public educational institutions in Turkey were
eventually dropped.98
Two negative effects likely occurred in the process of these
group mobilizations: group polarization and the decrease in ingroup diversity and overall social pluralism. As the Lautsi I example shows, by choosing the more activist posture and striking
down the state-installed cross in public schools, the Court transformed a symbol that might indeed became, for historical reasons,
aligned with secular values, into an identity-preserving symbol. In
doing so, it has made future voluntary negotiations over the presence and meaning of the symbol more difficult. The Court’s decision attracted the noise of the defenders of the symbol and silenced
those that might adhere to the cross as a symbol but would, for
various reasons, prefer to see it removed from public schools. The
decision not to defer to the prior state-backed social norm undermined possibilities for achieving societal consensus on the meaning of the cross under the circumstances of increased diversity.
What was previously perhaps an authentic support for the cross as
a religious symbol in the schools is now likely a merely instrumental opportunistic or strategic support, justified by reasons unrelated to the symbol itself.
Paradoxically, the Court’s decision in Lautsi I, ostensibly seeking to affect social norms and increase inclusion, ended up confirming the prior practice and transforming the surrounding social
meaning of the religious symbol. This was decried as a defeat of
inclusion and a decline of religious neutrality,99 although it is high97
RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 158–59 (2010) (discussing the
context behind the ratification of the amendment guaranteeing equal access to the
public education system, effectively lifting the ban on wearing headscarves in
schools).
98
On the treatment of the amendments in the Turkish Constitutional Court,
see generally Yaniv Roznai & Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendment—The Turkish Perspective: A comment on the Turkish Constitutional
Court’s Headscarf Decision, 10 INT’L. J. CONST. LAW 175 (2012). On the dismantling
of the headscarf ban, see Jonathan Head, Quiet End to Turkey’s College Headscarf
Ban, BBC NEWS, December 31, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe11880622 [https://perma.cc/MNY7-RGE6] (explaining the context behind the
amendment and noting both positive reactions and negative backlash).
99
See, e.g., Richard Moon, Christianity, Multiculturalism, and National Identity:
A Canadian Comment on Lautsi and Others v. Italy, in THE LAUTSI PAPERS:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
CLASSROOM 241–66, 263 (Jeroen Temperman ed., 2012) (examining the significance
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ly questionable as to whether either inclusion or neutrality is increased by removal of the cross, since this action unnecessarily alienates those who would like to retain the cross in the schools
without any real off-setting benefits to anyone else.100
A similar process, this time owing to the Court’s upholding of
the margin of appreciation, occurred in the aftermath of the Sahin
headscarf decision. It is highly uncertain that prior to the Sahin decision the headscarf had a politicized meaning, as the Turkish government claimed it to, and the Court, relying on the margin of apAs the dissenting Justice Tulkens
preciation, affirmed.101
recognized, on the record of the Sahin decision, there was nothing
to suggest that the student was intending to use a headscarf to
pressure others or send a political message.102 After Sahin, however, headscarf became a mobilizing identitarian symbol whose extant individual religious meaning appears to have become entirely
irrelevant.103 This increased the intra-group solidarity and out-ofgroup competition among the supporters and opposers of the
headscarf in an educational context, producing group polarization.104 After ensuing social and political change in Turkey, this
polarization now produces adverse effects, as those who oppose
the headscarf are now exposed to punitive measures.105
of the crucifix in Canadian institutions).
100 See Joseph Weiler, Editorial: Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux, 21 EUR.
J. INT’L. L. 1 (2010) (pointing out that simply removing the cross in public schools
under current conditions hardly improves inclusion).
101 See Sahin, supra note 7, para. 115 (citing previous Courts decisions that affirm significance of the religious symbolism of the headscarf).
102 Id. para. 7 (Justice Tulkens, dissenting). For a further discussion along the
same lines, see Smet, supra note 53 at 126 (examining the fallacies in the Court’s
assumptions, and noting, for example, that the student was not in a position of
authority or power and that the “victims” of the potential indoctrination were
adults, not children).
103
For an overview of literature on identity disputes related to headscarf issues in Turkey, see Roznai and Yolcu, supra note 97, at 176, and note 4.
104
Similar polarizing effects also occur when a state supports religious symbols; cf. Eric Posner, The Legal Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEG. THEORY 33, 50–
51 (1996).
105
This much can be concluded from Pekünlü v. Turkey, App. No. 25832/14,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2017)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-174537
[https://perma.cc/U7DZ-M53Q], where the Court held that an application by a
university lecturer who contested his criminal conviction for preventing a student
wearing a headscarf from entering a higher education institution is inadmissible.
See AFP, Turkey Jails Professor for “Denying Headscarved Student Entry”, Daily MAIL
ONLINE (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article2852116/Turkey-jails-professor-denying-headscarved-student-entry.html
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In retrospect, under conditions of what is best described as an
increase in publicity and heterogeneity of local norms and a decrease of state social control in Turkey, the Court’s decision to defer to the state-backed rule and prohibit a religious symbol likely
undermined the possibilities for the mediation of a social dispute
over a symbol whose concrete social relevance was—and is—
grossly exaggerated, but which served as a focal point for strategic
mobilizations with far-reaching and dramatic consequences.106
There is another side to this. Viewed from the outside, religious
symbols enhance the visibility of the group, whereas viewed from
the inside they act as a mechanism for sustaining group membership and policing boundaries. The prohibition of a religious symbol likely increases its value and serves to strengthen in-group solidarity by increasing group commitment and decreasing the
internal group pluralism and even group membership.107 This is
because prohibitions of symbols might be acceptable to less enthusiastic members of religious groups, and unacceptable for the more
enthusiastic members of religious groups or their strategic supporters.
The latter group can use the perception of grievance and the
sense of rights-entitlement for purposes of social and political mobilization in pursuit of group causes through litigation.108 From a
[https://perma.cc/8PKB-FCRK].
106
Immediately following the Court’s Fourth Section Sahin decision, later
confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the Court (see Sahin, supra note 7), Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan alluded to the Court’s decision being political and based on double standards. See Zaman, Erdoğan on Sahin Verdict: Double
Standard, BIANET (Jul. 5, 2004), http://bianet.org/english/print/38297-erdoganon-sahin-verdict-double-standard [https://perma.cc/PGH3-BRPM]. Post-2010,
the headscarf ban was lifted in both educational and state institutions (with the
exception of judges, prosecutors, police and military personnel), with Prime Minister Erdoğan commenting that “[a] dark time eventually comes to an end . . . .
Headscarf-wearing women are full members of the republic, as well as those who
do not wear it”; see Turkey Lifts Decades-Old Ban on Headscarves, AL JAZEERA
ENGLISH,
October
8,
2013,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/10/turkey-lifts-decades-old-banheadscarves-201310814177943704.html [https://perma.cc/TC3V-BTXK].
107
Cf. Michael W. McConnell & Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L REV. 1, 58 (1989) (suggesting that similar consequences occur when religious groups are generally persecuted, but that the exact effect depends on the strength of group commitment.)
108
See Effie Fokas, Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in
the Shadow of European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence, 4
OXFORD. J. L. & RELIGION 54, 68-69 and accompanying notes (2015) (discussing how
litigation mobilizes social and political movements well beyond the immediate
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strategic point of view, the outcome of the litigation at the Court
may not matter at all. Any decision of the Court, whether in favor
of or against the prohibition of the religious symbol, will be beneficial for committed groups and their strategic supporters with a
vested interest in the Court’s decision. The positive decision is a
criticism of the state-backed prohibition that confirms the group’s
pre-existing beliefs and mobilizes it for future actions, while the
negative decision can serve as a cause for adversarial mobilization
and further increase the group commitment across multiple locations. In other words, any decision of the Court can be a useful
tool for group mobilization. If the Sahin and Lautsi I decision are
analyzed this way, what appears as a loss or a victory for individual applicants, respectively, was a gain for the strategic normentrepreneurs.
The picture that emerges out of this analysis is paradoxical.
Given the adverse effects of group mobilizations, the reality created in the aftermath of Court’s decisions is the exact opposite of
what the Court purports its decisions should help create. At least
some of the Court’s holdings on religious symbols have polarizing
effects and, more problematically, result in a decrease in internal
in-group diversity and overall social pluralism. It is simply not the
case that all Muslim women wear or want to wear headscarves,
pressure others to do so, or feel pressured by others to do so; nor
do all committed Catholics or the supporters of Christian traditions
necessarily always prefer to see crosses in public schools. Yet, in
the aftermath of decisions like Lautsi Grand Chamber, Sahin, and
others to follow, and against the background of group polarization
and the divisive in- and out-of-group competition, these individuals and groups will have a harder time communicating their arguments within in-group or out-of-group communication or in a public space. They are more likely to become internal minorities of the
majority or “minorities among the minorities.”
If that is indeed so, however, the Court’s statement on the obligation of CoE States in the Sahin decision appears an irony at best,
and sarcasm at worst:
[T]he Court has frequently emphasized the State’s role as
the neutral and impartial organizer of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is
conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance
effects of legal decision).
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in a democratic society . . . Accordingly, the role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of tension by
eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups
tolerate each other.109 (emphasis added)

3.4. Mobilization of Loyalists
Religious symbols are often at loggerheads with state laws.
Under conditions of heterogeneity, regulation of religious symbols
can have multiple polarizing effects, producing conflicting loyalties
and functioning as in- and out-of-group “loyalty tests” for two reasons: On the one hand, for religious groups, symbols act as mechanism for indicating group membership , through which individuals arguably signal group loyalty. On the other, laws function as
categorizing mechanisms that inform a society of the labeling of a
group or individual as socially (un)acceptable, coordinating and
legitimizing the positive or negative group attention toward the already-categorized-as-socially-distant,110 particularly when the law
prohibits certain religious symbols and, in doing so, influences
people’s beliefs and behavior towards the person who engages (or
refrains from engaging) in the now-forbidden symbolic action.
As an example, consider the 2011 French Law banning burqas.111 On its face, the law targeted veiled women. However, they
were hardly its only targets, since laws prohibiting symbols of the
“other group” are not simple rules, but instead pieces of social information. They target not only the opposing group (out-ofgroup), but also the in-group outliers who might be hesitant to engage in confrontation with the symbols and practices of the other
group, all in order to strengthen the in-group solidarity.112 This
See Sahin, supra note 7, para. 107, internal citations omitted.
MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK, 91–92, 100-02 (1986) (discussing how institutions affect social categorizations and attach positive and negative
labels to behavior and persons).
111
Loi No 2010-1192 du 11 Oct. 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage
dans lespace public, Journal Officiel (JORF) 12 Oct. 2010, with additional provisions, in force since April 2011, cited in Steinbach, supra note 9 at 31 n. 17.
112
On the in-group effects of the prohibition of out-of-group symbols, see
Eric Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEG.
STUD. 765, 785–89 (1998). Effects of prohibition on geographically and cognitively
distant out-of-group members can be even stronger, see Alex Geisinger & Ivan
Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, 112 PENN ST.
109
110
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means the 2011 Law symbolically targeted two groups: the obvious
suspects, considered disloyal, not “really French” but preferring
instead their “Muslim” identity over their “French” one,113 and the
less obvious suspects, the potentially loyal but faint of heart members of the mainstream. The law, in other words, served as a focal
point for “mobilizing loyalties,” that is, convincing potentially unconcerned members of the mainstream that loyalism is a prevalent
social norm and attitude.114
Evidence of this phenomenon is available in the SAS case. Prior to the enactment of the French 2011 Law banning burqas, barely
1900 women wore a burqa in the country. In the period between
2011 and 2016, less than 200 citations for violation were issued per
year.115 The prohibition, in other words, was not intended to be
fully applied, but had an expressive and symbolic role with nevertheless very real social effects. After the 2011 Law confirmed and
legitimized social disapproval of burqas and their bearers, incidences of attacks on women wearing burqas increased. The attackers cited loyalty to laïcité as a motivation for the attacks and
sought to self-enforce the law spontaneously by physically and
verbally harassing the women wearing burqas.116 As was shown
during the SAS trial, the application of the 2011 Law legitimized
L. REV. 77, 135 (2007). This suggests that the burqa ban was perhaps a foreign policy measure, rather than a purely domestic issue.
113
The incompatibility of the French and Muslim identity, for historical reasons, has been a lingering topic for many years, see T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicite: A Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419,
456 (2004).
114
As Eric Posner argues, when members of the majority discriminate
against minorities, they do so not necessarily because of their innate animosity
towards them, but in order to signal loyalty to other members of the majority,
which is why norms of discrimination tend to spread (and disappear) rapidly,
mobilizing large groups of people in the process. See Posner, Symbols, Signals, and
Social Norms in Politics and the Law, supra note 112, at 786-87.
115 See Robert Zaretsky, These Hijab-Inspired Clothes Just Reignited a Major Culture
War
in
France,
THE
WEEK
(Apr.
7,
2016),
http://theweek.com/articles/616468/hijabinspired-clothes-just-reignited-majorculture-war-france [https://perma.cc/ZT7Y-PHPS].
116
See Open Society Justice Initiative, After the Ban: The Experiences of 35
Women
of
the
Full-Face
Veil
in
France,
3,
(Sep.
2013),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/after-the-banexperience-full-face-veil-france-20140210.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BBT7-QVV4],
and Valeria Costa-Kostristky, France and the Veil – the Dark Side of the Law
OPENDEMOCRACY (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/valeriacosta-kostritsky/france-and-veil-%E2%80%93-dark-side-of-law
[https://perma.cc/RM45-RW6W].
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violence against women wearing a burqa and increased their overall intersectional structural discrimination, likely because the prohibition emboldened the public who felt compelled to question the
“true Frenchness” of the veiled women.117
In essence, the informational function of the 2011 Law was
hardly only about those who—for reasons of their racial, ethnic,
and religious background—are allegedly resisting the influence of
laïcité and healthy assimilation, and are potentially disloyal citizens.118 More likely, it was meant as a loyalty mobilizing mechanism for those within the mainstream that are insufficiently opposed to the former group. The suspicion that the different racial,
ethnic, and religious groups will exist apart from the rest of the society, and therefore exhibit a lack of loyalty corrosive to cultural
unity, is hardly new in France, and was detested from the early
days of the French Revolution.119 For complex historical reasons,
the link between loyalty to the unitary Republic and the fidelity to
laïcité became intertwined both as a matter of the constitutional
text120 and the public order of the Republican cultural unity.121 The
link is meant to signal “adhesion to a political project, loyalty towards a
civilization which is a common good, and the intense feeling of sharing in
each other’s fate,”122 with the laïcité having a status of “. . .the first re117
See SAS, supra note 9, at para. 104, citing Open Society Justice Initiative,
supra note 116.
118
As empirical studies show, from the 1970s to the late 1980s, most French
Muslims held laïcité in high regard and considered it to be a guarantee of religious freedom, becoming “experts” in laïcité, see AMELIE BARRAS, REFASHIONING
SECULARISMS IN FRANCE AND TURKEY: THE CASE OF THE HEADSCARF BAN 74 (2014).
119
In the aftermath of the 1789 French Revolution, the French National Assembly debated whether the Jews could be “transformed” into loyal citizens of the
new French Republic, given Judaism’s communitarian leanings. WENDY BROWN,
REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 51 (2008).
Identical views persist even today and, for example, Jehovah’s Witnesses in
France have been subjected to similar doubts. See SUSAN PALMER, THE NEW
HERETICS OF FRANCE: MINORITY RELIGIONS, LA REPUBLIQUE, AND THE GOVERNMENTSPONSORED “WAR ON SECTS” 200 (2011) (“The Jehovah’s Witnesses are perceived as
undermining loyalty to the Republic, as they set up their own God-centered
‘kingdoms.’”).
120 See Const., Art.1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular (laic), democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the
law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs”).
121
See CÉCILE LABORDE, CRITICAL REPUBLICANISM: THE HIJAB CONTROVERSY
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 173 (2008) (discussing Republican solidarity and its
relationship to laïcité).
122
Fred Constant, La citoyenneté (Montchrestien, 1998) 28, cited in Laborde
supra note 121 at 181 n. 41, internal citations omitted.
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ligion of the Republic,” one that requires “obedience and belief.”123
Litigants like the applicant in SAS and those in earlier trials on
headscarves in French national courts correctly understood the nature of the laws targeting religious symbols, and, likely aware of
the epistemic strength of laïcité as tool of the struggle against the
real or alleged communitarianism present among French Muslims,124 have pledged their own allegiance and loyalty to laïcité to
no avail.125 Since laïcité itself is simultaneously a value-claim and a
constitutional standard whose exact scope and outer limits are left
strategically under-defined, no argumentation or evidence suffices.126 French courts have, on multiple occasions, argued that, even
in the absence of evidence of social harm, headscarves and burqas
are an objective threat to the laïcité and the equality of sexes, and a
means of promoting communal loyalties and group thinking
against which the Republic must stand united.127
The Court’s decision in SAS falls into the long line of the
123
Dominique Moïsi cited in Steven Erlanger and Tamura De FreytasTamura, Old Tradition of Secularism Clashes with France’s New Reality, CRUX (Feb. 8,
2015), http://www.cruxnow.com/faith/2015/02/08/old-tradition-of-secularismclashes-with-frances-new-reality/ [https://perma.cc/77NL-NECA]; see also
Raphael Liogier, Laicite on the Edge in France: Between the Theory of Church-State
Separation and the Praxis of State-Church Confusion, 9 MACQUARIE L. J. 25, 25–26, 43–
44 (2009) (explaining that laïcité “morphed into a socio-cognitive frame of reference, a sort of screen wallpaper for France’s social panorama, endorsed as such by
all social groups”).
124
On transnational religious communitarianism among French Muslims,
see John R. Bowen, Does French Islam Have Borders? Dilemmas of Domestication in a
Global Religious Field, 106 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 43 (2004).
125
For analysis of the intersection of loyalty and “foreignness” issues and
French headscarf trials and debates on burqa banning, see, generally, Liogier, supra
note 123.
126
On the vagueness and multiple meanings of laïcité, see JOHN R. BOWEN,
WHY THE FRENCH DON’T LIKE HEADSCARVES: ISLAM, THE STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE 32
(2007) (noting that laïcité is “useful for political debates because its use conveys
the double illusion that everyone knows what laïcité means and that this meaning
has long been central to French Republicanism.”). Similarly, see Herman T. Salton,
France’s Other Enlightenment: Laicite, Politics and the Role of Religion in French Law, 5
J. POL. L. 30, 30–31 (2012), and Mohammad Idriss, Lai’cite and the banning of the “hijab” in France, 25 LEGAL STUD. 260, 260–65 (2006) (arguing that there is no single
definition behind the concept of laïcité because its meaning holds various interpretations amongst academic commentators).
127
Decisions of French courts and arguments used in cases involving prohibitions of headscarves and burqas in the period 2008–11 (including the post-2011
burqa-banning law period) are discussed in John R. Bowen, How the French State
Justifies Controlling Muslim Bodies: From Harm-Based to Values-Based Reasoning, 78
SOC. RES. 325, 326–344 (2011) (detailing the various arguments for banning burqas,
which the French courts considered over the years from 2003 to 2011).
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Court’s controversial French cases involving prohibitions of religious attire in schools.128 It added an additional aura of human
rights legitimacy to national laws’ prohibitions, since the Court
echoed various French courts and provided the ammunition for the
mobilization of loyalists that sought to prevent an apathetic public
and future governments from failing, willfully or through sheer inertia, to confront political threats to Republican unity and freedoms.129
The process is partially reminiscent of Moravscik’s claim that,
from a republican-liberal perspective, creating a quasi-independent
judicial body such as the Court is a tactic used by governments to
bind (“lock in”) future governments and stabilize institutions in
the face of nondemocratic political threats,130 in this case a religious
threat. The “lock-in” argument was originally developed as an explanation of new Eastern European democracies’ haste to join the
Convention and accept the Court’s jurisdiction. Given that the prior “lock-in” with the Convention did not prevent governments
such as that of Hungary (and others) taking a turn toward becom128
The Court considered multiple applications of Sikh and Muslim primary
and high school pupils prohibited from wearing turbans and headscarves, respectively, to be inadmissible on the grounds of the margin of appreciation, thereby
deferring to the French March 2004 law banning ostentatious religious symbols in
schools. See cases cited in supra note 31. Similarly, the Court confirmed the expulsion of secondary school pupils in France for refusing to remove headscarves
during physical education and sports classes. Dogru v France , App. no.
27058/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90039
[https://perma.cc/Y3Y7-5UCM]; Kervanci v France , App. no. 31645/04, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
(2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90047
[https://perma.cc/M82C-YFBE]. Apart from the disputes involving religious insignia in schools in France, in two far less contested cases, the Court also relied on
the margin of appreciation to uphold limitations on religious manifestations in the
context of the security checks. See El Morsli v. France, App. No. 15585/06, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-2109 [https://perma.cc/N76MTK62] (holding that the margin of appreciation allows the French authorities to
deny an entry visa to an applicant who refuses to remove her veil for an identity
check); and Phull v. France, App. No. 35753/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-77018
[https://perma.cc/SXF8-XLUC]
(holding that requiring a practicing Sikh to remove their turban during security
checks at an airport is a measure within the limits of the margin of appreciation).
129
See SAS, supra note 9, paras. 15–17 (citing the French Parliament resolution supporting the 2011 French law banning burqas for reasons of the defense of
Republican values in the face of subversive religious threat).
130
See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L. ORG. 217, 220 (2000) (“From a ‘republican
liberal’ perspective . . . creating a quasi-independent judicial body is a tactic used
by governments to ‘lock in’ and consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability vis-a-vis nondemocratic political threats.”).
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ing illiberal democracies,131 it remains to be seen whether this strategy will work for high-status states that enjoy more deference from
the Court.
4. IMPLICATIONS
The varied treatment of different religious symbols in cases involving France, Italy, Switzerland, and Turkey presented above,
and the changes and (in)consistencies in the Court’s freedom of religion jurisprudence in cases involving Turkey as opposed to those
involving France, show that the sovereign consent and a threat of
non-compliance as a single cause behind the Court’s fallback on
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation is only a partial explanation. The margin of appreciation is the Court’s status-seeking
mechanism, whose application varies vertically (between the highand low-status states), and horizontally, depending on the social
status and the distance of religious symbols from mainstream social norms.
This part discusses further implications of the vertical status of
states and horizontal status of norms on the Court’s decisionmaking process, and argues that, due to an increase in religious diversity, negative mobilizations shift the Court behavior further toward status-based views of states and religion.
4.1. Vertical Status of States and Status-Based Toleration
The implication that can be derived from the considerations
discussed above is that most of the time the application of the margin of appreciation seemingly depends on the inverse relationship
between state status and the status of a symbol: the higher status
of the state and the lower and more socially distant status of the
symbol, the more leniency is given and the margin of appreciation
is relied upon. This increases the Court’s status vis-à-vis highstatus states, for two primary reasons. Firstly, the Court, with little

131
Id. at 220. On the turn towards the illiberal democracy in Hungary after
enactment of the 2012 Hungarian Constitution (Fundamental Law), and the negative reactions of multiple Europe-wide institutions, including the Court, see Jusic,
supra note 2, at 209, n.63.
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risk to itself given the low social status of the disputed symbols,
enlarges the freedom of action of high status states prospectively,
or, in other words, the Court second-guesses state future orientation and aligns itself with it. Secondly, the Court positions itself as
a de facto agent of high-status CoE states’ seeking to produce norms
around which the emerging consensus of both high- and lowstatus states can be manufactured. In short, in dealing with the
high-status states, the Court, using the margin of appreciation, decreases its production of law due to the status of states,132 and it allows high status states to increase the quantity of law and create
(or give an impetus for the creation of) a consensus through norm
diffusion that increases social distance internally within states, and
aims at decreasing the distance across states through the adoption
of formally similar regulations.133
This further implies that the Court will be more permissive toward religious symbols and religion in general in cases when the
status of the state coincides with the cultural or social status of the
symbol or religious group. In such cases, Court’s actions are based
on pragmatic considerations or status-based toleration rather than
considerations of liberal, inclusive pluralism. In Eweida and Others
v United Kingdom, for example, the Court considered the prohibition of wearing a discreet cross by the private employer an unjustified interference and found no interference when the public employer requested virtually the same of the second applicant.134 As
the case emerged from a high-status state, the UK, and involved a
symbol that does not suffer from being distanced from mainstream
norms, it is obvious that Court took no risks. It did not grant a
margin of appreciation to a high-status state, but since the nature
of symbol was within the mainstream, the high status of the state
was hardly jeopardized.
Additional evidence that the Court essentially practices statusbased toleration based on convergence of the status of the state and
religious groups can be found in its other Article 9 cases. These
cases involve the treatment of marginal (“low-status”) religious
132 Law varies directly with social status and with higher status, law is more
lenient and forgiving. DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE 10 (1989).
133
Cf. MOSHE HIRSCH, INVITATION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
129–56 (2015) (discussing, on the example of interaction between international investment tribunals and human rights, how cultural distance negatively affects
norm diffusion among social groups. Adoption of the similar regulations and
norms is supposed to decrease the cultural distance between states.).
134 See Eweida, supra note 3.
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groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, by the low-status states.135 It
was not by chance that one of the Court’s first important decision
finding a violation of Article 9 was the 1993 judgment in Kokkinakis
v. Greece,136 a case involving Greece’s prohibition of proselytizing
by Jehovah’s Witnesses. Prior to this case, nearly all applications
invoking violations of Article 9 were found to be inadmissible as
“manifestly ill-founded” by the Court and by the European Commission on Human Rights. The trend continued and throughout
the final decade of the 20th and first decade of the 21st century, the
Court frequently decided in favor of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a religious group considered to be socially distant and, for that reason,
persecuted in many countries, finding the low-status states of the
former Soviet Union and Southeastern Europe, such as Russia and
Greece, breached their obligation to respect the Convention.137
Simultaneously, however, the Court was more than lenient towards the punitive treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses and new religious movements in France, although France’s attitude towards
non-mainstream religions (“sects”) was arguably more punitive
than the one found in the countries of the former Soviet Union.138

135
See GLEN NEWEY, TOLERATION IN POLITICAL CONFLICT 13 (2013) (referring
to this type of tolerance of marginal religious groups as status-based tolerance because it relegates the tolerated to a second-class civic status).
136
Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57827 [https://perma.cc/F2X6-XQNZ].
137 See Richardson & Shoemaker, supra note 18, at 106–11 (discussing the difference in the Court’s decisions on religious freedom in cases involving Greece,
Russia and France).
138
Id. at 114. On the harsh legal and social treatment of “new” religious
movements such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Soka Gakkai, and Scientology, and minority religious groups like French Muslims and Sikhs in France, see Palmer, supra
note 119, at 178 (concluding that “France stands out as a unique example of intolerance toward religious minorities among the countries of Western Europe.”).
Only in 2011 did the Court start signaling a minimal change of attitude toward the
treatment of minority religions in France. See Association Les Témoins de
Jéhovah v. France, App. No. 8916/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105386
[https://perma.cc/A7R6-KJ9S]
(holding that a supplementary tax assessment of €45 million applied to donations
marked for Jehovah’s Witnesses violated Art. 9, as it was not a foreseeable regulation in accordance with the law). Moreover, the case Izzettin Dogan & Others v.
Turkey arguably falls into this group of cases. The Alevi community in Turkey
was perceived and treated as Islamic, but was nevertheless a non-mainstream
group of a lower status relative to the mainstream Sunni Islam. See Izzettin
Dogan & Others v. Turkey, supra note 58, paras. 35–45, para. 133. In other words,
the low status of a religious group and the low status of the state have coincided.
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4.2. Horizontal Mobilizations and Status
Due to a possibility of non-compliance with the Court’s decisions with little immediate costs, the CoE states ultimately retain
the upper hand against both the Court and the individuals seeking
redress in the Court. This creates a paradox: given the Court’s
deference toward the states and the mainstream symbols, such as
the crucifix, and the Courts rhetoric in cases involving socially controversial religious symbols (the headscarf or burqa), it might seem
that applicants with socially distant religious practices looking for
the Court’s support would have little or no incentive to litigate
claims involving religious symbols. Similarly, the states would
have little incentive to put up a strong defense against those
claims—it would be enough to ignore them. The cases discussed
above, however, suggest that for various groups, litigation in the
Court is a strategy used for various types of mobilizations aimed at
increasing or protecting their own status. Such mobilizations occur
in two somewhat extreme situations both arising when the horizontal status of mainstream and non-mainstream social norms and
symbols as their expressions are contested.
At one extreme, mobilization occurs once a disputed religious
symbol has a strong horizontal social status firmly embedded within mainstream social norms across states (as in, e.g., the Lautsi cases). The strength of the horizontal embeddedness of the norm
abolishes the vertical difference between the high and low status
states and provides a cause for both state and social mobilization
that can endanger the Court’s status and authority. In such cases,
the margin of appreciation is based on a threat of social (not only
state) non-compliance, and the danger to the Court’s status is extreme due to a possibility of the systemic friction of the institutional framework built around the Convention. Hence, as the Court
itself is aware, at least in the area of religious symbols, the Court is
subservient to social norms and its decisions cannot vary widely
from what the Court perceives as the preexisting social structure in
which the norms of its audience(s) are created.139 However, this
sheds doubt on the Court’s oft-repeated statement that the margin
of appreciation is inversely related to a lack of consensus across
139 On this point, see Mancini, supra note 21, at 26–27 (“The collective reputation of a court depends, to a large extent, on the audience at which its opinions are
aimed . . . . [I]f a court’s interpretations deeply differ from the convictions of the
people, the people will start resisting judicial decisions.”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/1

2018]

The European Court’s Margin of Appreciation

607

states. In the Lautsi Grand Chamber case, it was the existence of a
widespread social consensus, around which marginally different
state systems of expressing the social consensus have been erected,
that prompted the Court to resort to the margin of appreciation.
At the other extreme, mobilizations occur at the point when a
symbol is deemed to be extremely distant from the state-backed
mainstream norms, as in, e.g., the SAS case, where the state collided with the socially controversial nature of the burqa; or in Sahin
case, where, due to the Court’s perception of the oppositional nature of headscarf relative to state-backed mainstream norms, the
state further collided with an allegedly controversial and socially
distant symbol. In such cases, the direction of mobilizations is contingent on the domestic constituencies. It can move in the direction
of confirming the embedded mainstream norms like loyalism, as in
the wake of the SAS case, to which the Court’s decisions more or
less accede. Alternatively, as the aftermath of the Sahin case
shows, in the short- and long-term, mobilization served as a corrective of the Court’s perception, coercing it to adjust its views of the
distribution of horizontal social norms, for which religious symbols
are but a proxy. In the latter case, what was considered a nonmainstream symbol crossed over to the mainstream.
The main conclusion is that the Court is captive to social mobilizations and is itself an institution whose status is dependent on—
and even subservient to—wider social approval (or at least the absence of an active social disapproval), meaning that the Court is
relevant not only when cooperating with states, but also when cooperating with social forces.140 Under conditions of contestations
over social status caused by increased religious diversity, even the
Court’s resorting to the margin of appreciation, which is basically a
form of judicial escape, is more likely to exacerbate than to resolve
tensions, further reducing the function of law as a conflictresolving and rights-protecting mechanism.141 Therefore, any at140
Cf. Malcolm Feeley, Hollow Hopes, Flypaper, and Metaphors, 17 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 745, 751 (1992) (“[T]he conventional wisdom among political scientists
and sociologists who have studied these matters is that the courts by themselves
are not very powerful and, at best, are important at the margins or in conjunction
with other governmental bodies.”).
141
See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Myth of the Neutral State and the Individualization of Religion: The Relationship between State and Religion in the Face of Fundamentalism, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2445, 2446 (2009) (discussing judicial escape options in
cases involving religion and social conflicts); see generally Aileen Kavanagh, Judicial Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 23 (2010) (discussing how
judicial concerns over social perceptions (“reputation”) result in self-restraint and
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tempt to venerate the Court as the counter-majoritarian protector
of the human rights of minorities against the oppressive majorities—an image based on the problematic and somewhat condescending view of oppressed minorities in need of protection—
appears largely unfounded, and should be viewed with skepticism.142 The Court is only capable of following social changes or
keeping its finger on the pulse of temporary majorities, but not of
leading.143
While the Court itself has, on multiple occasions, stated that it
will use social change as an indication of the new patterns of social
behavior and consensus across European societies,144 following the
temporary majorities is problematic for two reasons. First, the
Court may become a victim of the common wisdom fallacy since
judicial evaluations of social facts or deferral to legislative bodies
often strengthen conflation of normative assessments and unfounded empirical observations that do not guarantee normatively
or empirically appealing results.145
Second, consensus is prone to biases and various types of social
falsifications and manipulations.146 For that reason, social consensus is often thin and inauthentic and based on mimicry, as with the
process of the democratization of Eastern European societies post1990 when these countries, partially supported by the Court, were

the sub-optimal protection of human rights).
142
See Hillel Y. Levin, Rethinking Religious Minorities’ Political Power, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1617, 1624–25 (2015) (discussing how the relative social position of
religious minorities is often underappreciated, just as the majoritarian oppression
of minority religions is overappreciated). The premise that courts, at least those in
the U.S., are counter-majoritarian institutions has been thoroughly debunked by a
number of empirical studies, and, for an overview of the relevant literature, see
Law, supra note 22, at 728–30 and accompanying footnotes.
143
Similarly, see Helfer and Voeten, supra note 25, at 106 (“[T]he Strasbourg
Court engages in a kind of majoritarian activism.”).
144
Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 133, 141 (1993).
145 On the complicated impact of social and legislative choices on the practice
of various higher courts, and the need to avoid these, see Niels Petersen, Avoiding
the Common-Wisdom Fallacy: The Role of Social Sciences in Constitutional Adjudication,
11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 294, 297 (2013) (arguing that, in the context of judicial decision-making, “the practical conclusions of a normative argument may be misleading if the normative argument is based on unrealistic empirical assumptions.”).
146
See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1997) (claiming that the tendency to
falsify public preferences to conform to social expectations creates a false sense of
social consensus).
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expected to emulate the established democracies. Unforeseen
events can turn social change and alleged consensus upside down
with potentially tragic consequences, as the religious and ethnic
conflicts in former Yugoslavia and rapid changes in places like
Turkey amply show.147
4.3. The Court’s Status Concerns and Status Relativism
With exceptions for discreet symbols worn by employees of
private entities established by Eweida and symbols in public space
established by Ahmet Arslan (later contradicted by SAS), the
Court’s jurisprudence on religious symbols so far exhibits two
trends. First, the Court embraces the progressive enlargement of
the scope of the prohibition of non-mainstream individual religious symbols from a specific context to a general public space using the margin of appreciation, often expressing an unfavorable
view of the Islamic symbols worn by Muslim women.148 Second, in
its opinions that have dealt with mainstream symbols (e.g., the
crucifix in the Lautsi Grand Chamber judgment) and nonmainstream symbols (Islamic ones in particular), the Court has relied upon various sociological and theological analyses, and translated these into a language of standards of pluralism, neutrality,
equality, and toleration, a language that, as critics have argued,
seems unsubstantiated and vacuous,149 and lacking in procedural
fairness towards individual applicants.150
147
See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 647–49 (1998) (discussing how sudden social
shocks in the previously peaceful and relatively unified society of former Yugoslavia provoked large-scale social segregation along ethnic lines).
148
Steinbach, supra note 9, at 51; Cebada Alicia Romero, The European Court
of Human Rights and Religion: Between Christian Neutrality and the Fear of Islam, 11
N.Z. J. PUB. INT’L L. 75, 94–100 (2013).
149 For a critique of Court’s arguments in cases involving Islamic symbols, see
Rorive, supra note 5, at 2684 and accompanying footnotes. See also Fish, supra note
71 (commenting on the Court’s Lautsi Grand Chamber decision and noting that
the judgment rests not only on the unpersuasive argument that removing crucifixes from classrooms would diminish diversity and tolerance, but also on “the
plausible-but-flawed argument (the crucifix is a symbol of democracy and national unity), the bizarre argument (the crucifix is a symbol of Christianity, but Christianity is not a religion), the theoretical-and-therefore-irrelevant argument (a crucifix can mean many things) and the empirically unpersuasive argument (because
crucifixes don’t come with voice boxes, they communicate no active message).”).
150 See Eva Brems & Laurens Lavrysen, Procedural Justice in Human Rights Ad-
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These criticisms appear correct, but their implications are limited. The long-term status of the Court is not dependent on adherence to procedural fairness (which affects and is relevant only for
individuals), but on the acquiescence of high-status states and
mainstream social norms (a benchmark for measuring social distance of a religious symbol), both of which affect the Court’s authoritative status. Simply put, it has thus far been beneficial and
affordable for the Court to resort to the margin of appreciation and
describe Christian symbols as passive and aligned with values of
secularism and diversity while interpreting Islamic symbols as illiberal and insufficiently contained, as the Court has sensed that a
majority of its primary audience among the high-status states and
wider public feels the same.151
The motivation for this behavior of the Court is not some “hidden anti-Muslim bias,” but rather the Court’s own status concerns
that vary with and depend upon the wider relevance of the issue at
stake, and the norms and the composition of its primary audience.
To illustrate variance, consider the case I.A. v. Turkey. There,
somewhat paradoxically given its opinion in Sahin (connecting Islamic religious symbols with extremist movements in Turkey) and
an otherwise strong protection of the freedom of expression, the
Court relied on the margin of appreciation to acquiesce in the criminal conviction of a writer whose publications the Turkish authorities deemed to be insulting to Islamic traditions and beliefs.152
judication: The European Court of Human Rights, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 176, 186–87 (2013)
(discussing the Court’s neutrality and its characteristics transparency, accuracy
and correctability).
151
See Christoph Engel, Law as a Precondition for Religious Freedom, MPI
COLLECTIVE
GOODS
REPRINT
NO.
2011/6
14
(2011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1803254 [https://perma.cc/S7BF-YHNM] (stating that tolerance toward particular religions increases proportionally with their
level of social (self-)containment). In a sense, the Court’s margin of appreciation
is a tool for recognizing and dealing with the variance in the degree of toleration
and self-containment that different communities and religions exhibit over time.
152
I.A. v. Turkey, App. No. 42571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{“itemid”:[“001-70113”]}
[https://perma.cc/B32K-FXF5]. Though the judgment in I.A. v. Turkey was consistent with the Court’s case law on the protection of religious sensitivities from
gratuitously offensive and profane expression (see id. para. 24), as a matter of
principle its outcome stands in stark contrast to, for example, the case Gündüz v.
Turkey,
App.
No. 35071/97,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2004),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61522
[https://perma.cc/W5KT-R9T2]
(holding that a religious leader’s freedom of expression was violated when Turkish authorities convicted him for using a popular live TV broadcast to criticize the
government, publicly insult children born outside of marriage, and propose the
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In other words, the Court uses the margin of appreciation to
implicitly incorporate a relativistic status-based view of states and
societies, a view according to which society (both international and
national) consists of separate “communities of consents” with differentiated social standing based on perceived social and religious
characteristics that determine and condition capacity for the respect of human rights. While the margin of appreciation necessarily implies some degree of healthy relativism (or realistic universalism) that results in variation in treatment due to the different social
backgrounds and considerations,153 in its past judgments on religious symbols in different states, the Court has arguably overstepped its limits in terms of this relativism, and unnecessarily so.
The fact that the Court relies on a relativistic status-based
treatment of states and different religions might be neither surprising nor a result of the Court’s own making. The drafters of the
Convention saw the Court primarily as an instrument of external
democratization of low-status states, probably labored under assumption of relative cultural homogeneity, and did not envision
that the Court would have to deal with changes of social norms resulting from the increase of pluralism in high-status states.154 The
Court, in other words, has been building on cultural presuppositions and assumptions of homogeneity which it itself did not create.155 If, as it is often argued, cultural homogeneity is one of the
introduction of Sharia law).
153
For an argument that the oft-repeated charge that relativism is a cause
behind the margin of appreciation rests on a simplistic and unreal understanding
of universality, see McGoldrick, supra note 6, at 37, 53. See generally James A.
Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 459 (2005) (arguing that
the application of the margin of appreciation implies some, but not full, relativism).
154
See LORD WOOLF, REVIEW OF THE WORKING METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT
OF
HUMAN
RIGHTS
7
(2005),
http://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Lord%20Woolf-2005-EN1587818.PDF
[https://perma.cc/J8UJ-Q883] (noting that the Convention was conceived as “an
early warning system to prevent states from lapsing into totalitarianism. It set out
the fundamental rights and freedoms that states should secure to everyone in
their jurisdiction, and provided a judicial enforcement system—the European
Court of Human Rights—by which states which violated human rights could be
called to account.”). See also Madsen, supra note 19, at 142–43 (discussing the historical trajectory of the Court in response to changes in political situations and increases in democratization).
155
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s hypothesis is that the free, liberal, and
democratic state rests on assumptions that it itself cannot deliver. In essence, the
hypothesis implies that underlying secularized Western Christian values spread
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prerequisites for effective transnational human rights adjudication,156 a contemporary withering away of (religious) homogeneity
could spell further deepening of the divide between the two (or
multiple) tracks of the margin of appreciation developed for different states and religious symbols (and religions more generally),
tracks that will make the Court less useful for individuals but more
useful for selected CoE states.157 This might harm the status of the
Court within certain sectors of society, and perhaps among a number of states. However, the damage to the status of the Court is unlikely to be a mortal blow, since courts have an influence over social life so long as social actors behave as if they matter.158

across a relatively homogenous society are necessary for the institutional existence
of a liberal and pluralistic state. See ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, STAAT,
GESELLSCHAFT, FREIHEIT: STUDIEN ZUR STAATSTHEORIE UND ZUM VERFASSUNGSRECHT
60 (1976) cited in Ladeur, supra note 141, at 2454 n.41. For further discussion of
Böckenförde’s hypothesis, see Asim Jusić, Actionable Pluralism and Toleration in Religiously Diverse Societies: For Whom and for What?, CEDAR (2015),
http://www.cedarnetwork.org/2015/04/18/2014-cedar-occasional-paper-no-7by-asim-jusic/ [https://perma.cc/M4AZ-RML7].
156 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 64, at 335–36, nn.265–67 (discussing literature that argues that the relative cultural and political homogeneity of states
positively affects the influence of supranational human rights tribunals such as
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights).
157
Proposals for differentiated approach to states based on the respective
differences in the quality of their judicial and legal systems have already been advanced. See Helen Keller et al., Debating the Future of the European Court of Human
Rights after the Interlaken Conference: Two Innovative Proposals, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L.
1025, 1044 (2010) (arguing that there is a need for a formalization of the system of
relative, rather than absolute, sovereign equality of states in order to preserve the
goals of the Convention). Protocol 15 to the Convention (not yet in force) seeks to
entrench the margin of appreciation directly into the Convention’s Preamble, and,
in doing so, set more explicit boundaries for the Court. Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, TREATY OFFICE (2013), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/fulllist/-/conventions/treaty/213 [https://perma.cc/BAM3-DUZU]. For further
discussion, see Sanader, supra note 69, at 203.
158
See JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT 17 (1987) (describing how political, social, and other institutions share a capacity to order social life because
people act as if they exist and matter). Similar to Brigham, Madsen notes that
notwithstanding the challenges to the Court’s authority and the low level of compliance with its decisions in Turkey, “the fact that so many cases are directed to
Strasbourg suggests conversely the emergence of a legal field in which the European Convention and the ECtHR are increasingly accepted among many audiences as a tool for legal and social change even though some government agents continue to resist it.” Madsen, supra note 19, at 164.
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5. CONCLUSION
The analysis of the Court’s case law on religious symbols
shows that even judicial doctrines of self-restraint such as the margin of appreciation can be used by the various constituencies and
states for purpose of mobilizations that result in adverse effects (as
in the cases of Sahin and SAS). At the same time, even the Court’s
rare activist decisions, such as Lautsi I, can result in a backlash.159
In short, the Court is “damned if it doesn’t, and damned if it does”:
both its restrained and more activist decisions can do more harm
than good, inflaming what are controllable low-intensity social
tensions, and create troubles where none initially existed.
This certainly does not imply that the Court’s decisions on religious symbols always act as a trigger for such mobilizations. It
simply means that, ironically, it might have been better had many
of the cases discussed in this article never been directed to the
Court in the first place. The Court, unable to entirely avoid these
issues, relied upon theoretical sociological and theological arguments to portray something that is, or was, already practically settled or was best left unresolved as an intractable conflict. The theory then became a self-fulfilling prophecy that exacerbated
controllable social tensions.
This is an unfortunate outcome that should have been avoided
not only by the Court, but also by the parties involved in these cases. Simply put, no one should be terribly impressed by either the
presence or absence of crucifixes and teachers and students with
headscarves in schools, or veiled women in the streets. Conversely, at times, individuals and institutions need to consciously abstain from gratuitously flaunting their identities through symbols,
as living in diverse yet stable societies requires shouldering the
costs of self-censorship. The sky will not fall in if this price is paid,
but many will be spared unnecessary troubles.
Quarrels caused by the presence of various religious symbols
in the public space will persist, and the Court will be invited to decide upon some of these in the future. At their core, disputes over
159 Activist decisions of the national courts tend to have unforeseen backlash
effects and, in the process, harm those they were meant to help. See generally
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (abridged ed. 2007) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education resulted
in a backlash that effectively worsened the social position of African-Americans in
the American South, which, in turn, led to national civil rights legislation).
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headscarves, turbans, crucifixes and burqas in schools, the workplace and public spaces across Europe are but minor symptoms of
the growing anxieties over institutional and social willingness and
capabilities for managing a continuously increasing and likely irreversible religious diversity. Historically, Europeans have hardly
been gentle with one another when settling religious differences,160
and since European democracies represent the social norms of past
generations, they are ill-equipped to deal with social and demographic change.161 This analysis suggests that international human
rights tribunals, like the Court, face an identical problem, and are
even less willing and well-equipped to deal with such phenomena.

160 See Petty, supra note 2, at 807 (discussing the history of European religious
conflicts).
161
See Stephen Holmes, Goodbye Future?, EUROZINE (Nov. 12, 2012),
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/article_2012-11-21-holmesen.html#footNote4 [https://perma.cc/MA6P-GWY3] (reexamining some aspects
of the disappointments of democracy after communism in the context of the recent increase in global dissatisfaction with democracy).
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